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1. PRAISE FOR RETHINKING 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT 
GOVERNANCE: PRINCIPLES FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY
Investment law has o ten been regarded as an isolated regime intended to
ensure investors’ beneﬁts. This book radically rethinks such law as a component
in global economic governance, and suggests changes to realign it with the
Sustainable Development Goals, including the reduction of poverty and
inequality. [The book] makes an original, well articulated, and solid contribution
that will become essential in any process aiming at the reform of that regime.
Carlos Correa, Executive Director, South Centre
Foreign direct investment (FDI) holds tremendous potential to enhance
economic growth and welfare. But FDI can also be beset by corrupt practices,
market distortions, and environmental damage. To secure positive outcomes
and avoid damaging results is an important objective for individual countries as
well as global institutions. Rethinking International Investment Governance:
Principles for the 21st Century provides a comprehensive assessment of rules and
regulations that govern FDI activities, and proposes reforms to help rebalance
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the rights of international investors and host states. This research will become
the “go-to” work for academics and policy-makers alike.
Theodore H. Moran, Marcus Wallenberg Chair in International Business and
Finance at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
The neoliberal economic order based on the facilitation of global trade and
investment, is being questioned. A signiﬁcant part of this process relates to
international investment law and investor-state arbitration. In recent years a
system of privatized international economic law has come to dominate the
relations between multinational enterprises and host states. This is based on a
network of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) that began in the years of post-
World War II decolonization. No one then knew or foresaw how this system
would develop. BITs lay dormant for many years until, in the 1990s, enterprising
lawyers discovered the power of BITs, not least because they contained
provisions for international investor-state arbitration. These treaties could be
used to rescue foreign investors and their investments from deals that had gone
wrong. In many instances, they had a good case against a host government that
had abused its political and/or legislative power to undermine a good,
productive, investment. However, more recently, BITs have gone further and
have become a threat, inhibiting governments from the legitimate pursuit of
public policy and development goals. A useful corrective for maladministration
has turned into a private weapon of anti-government. Possibly good for business
but bad for too many others.
This book seeks to assess and resolve the situation. It outlines how the system of
BITs and investor-state arbitration has gone wrong, how the system needs to
face up to the challenges and threats to humanity that the UN Sustainable
Development Goals seek to correct, and how it can be rebalanced to meet those
goals. Written by a team of expert authors, this short overview acts as an
essential starting point for any interested person who seeks an accessible primer
on the subject. It encapsulates the main trends of debate admirably and
succinctly and leads the reader to thought-provoking answers. The authors are
not under the illusion that changing the system of international investment law
and arbitration will be straightforward: vested interests are powerful and
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in luential. However, it o fers a road-map to change, which is always the ﬁrst
step toward it. I can recommend this book wholeheartedly.
Peter Muchlinski, Professor of International Commercial Law,  
SOAS University of London
This book makes a compelling case for revamping the current international
investment regime. It shows that the expansive interpretation of the principle of
"fair and equitable treatment" of foreign investors by arbitration tribunals
sometimes puts their rights ahead of those of domestic investors and, more
importantly, of the social and environmental rights of citizens in a given
territory. The book proposes, therefore, redesigning the regime as a system of
governance based on basic principles and substantive priorities, restoring the
regulatory autonomy of nation-states and the role of national court systems,
while recognizing that international cooperation on investment-related issues is
crucial for advancing sustainable development.
Jose Antonio Ocampo, Professor of Professional Practice in International and
Public A fairs, Columbia University School of International and Public A fairs
These authors show us how investment law can and should be reimagined to
advance the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). They go digging into the
innards of the investment law system to make visible the di ﬁculties and the
insu ﬁciencies. And then they give us a range of ﬁndings, observations, and
critiques that show us how it could be done.
Saskia Sassen, Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology, Columbia University
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The international investment law and policy regime is undergoing rapid change.
Who would have predicted, three years ago, that, in 2017, UNCITAL would begin
discussing the establishment of a multilateral investment court and the WTO a
multilateral framework for investment facilitation? It is therefore very timely to
discuss, from a critical perspective, weaknesses of the regime and outline how
they can be remedied. Anyone interested in this discussion will ﬁnd this slim
booklet very useful.
Karl Sauvant, Resident Senior Fellow,  
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
This innovative work, written by accomplished experts on various aspects of
foreign direct investment, debunks many foundational myths of international
investment law. These myths include the assertions that investment treaties
invariably lead to greater investment  lows, and consequentially to economic
development, and that investor-state arbitration is a neutral method of dispute
settlement. It is easy to be iconoclastic. The merit of the work lies in the fact that
it is incredibly creative in suggesting an alternative formulation of governance
standards that achieve desirable core values such as the eradication of poverty
and the promotion of human dignity. The alternative formulation promotes
sustainable development and avoids the fragmentation of international law by
giving weight to other obligations that a state has under the law. The notion of
balancing the interests of the foreign investor with those of the state, so as to
create new forms of treaties, referred to as “balanced treaties,” is not in itself
new, but this volume achieves for the ﬁrst time a reasoned statement of how the
balancing should be e fected. There are normative standards for the e fecting of
a meaningful balance. My criticism of such proposals based on the balancing of
interests is that they prioritize investment protection, reducing public interest
rationales into defences or exceptions a ter responsibility has been established.
The primary function of the state is the protection of the public, to which
function all other functions must yield. Yet, the practical preference for balanced
treaties will be the manner in which immediate ground for progress can be
achieved. This work promotes such a practical solution. It will provide guidance
on the subject for many years to come.
M Sornarajah, CJ Koh Professor of Law, National University of Singapore
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3. FOREWORD
The world economy is built upon global supply chains dominated by
transnational companies. The leading international powers, especially Britain
during the 19  century and the United States a ter World War II, have used
military force, diplomacy, and international law, to bolster their transnational
companies, by opening overseas markets, gaining access to vital resources, and
warding o f threats of expropriation. In recent decades, corporate power was
built into the sinews of international investment law. The world has been made
safe for transnational corporate capital. This important new volume aims to
change that, to make the world safe for sustainable development.
In the global capitalist system, the highest aim of international investment law
has been to ensure the easy entry of multinational companies into foreign
markets to grow proﬁts. International investment law aims to give the
transnational companies as many legal defenses as possible against foreign
regulations that would limit their proﬁtability or expropriate their property. As
this book importantly demonstrates, the system of International Investment
Agreements (IIAs), including the thousands of BITs with terms modeled on
templates largely established by the UK, US, and the Netherlands, among
others, are part of this elaborate system to privilege and entrench transnational
corporate capitalism.
Many of the IIAs’ restrictive rules favor outward investment by powerful
corporations, but perhaps none is proving so damaging and wrongheaded as the
system of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) embedded in these
th
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agreements. ISDS has introduced a system of international arbitration that gives
multinational companies the right to sue host governments for alleged
violations of the investment agreements before ad hoc arbitral tribunals. In
practice, these arbitration tribunals have turned out to be yet another way to
deter host governments, typically in developing countries, from adopting vital
regulations and tax policies for the common good of their citizens where such
regulations would limit corporate proﬁts.
As the volume makes clear, ISDS injects remarkable corporate power into the
relations between companies and host governments. Tribunals operate without
basic standards of the rule of law and adopt legal theories that essentially bar
host governments from regulating to promote public health, environmental
sustainability, or social justice (including protecting the rights of indigenous
peoples, routinely trampled by powerful land-grabbing companies). They do
this without basic standards of transparency, rights of interested parties to
intervene, in accordance with national law, or even stare decisis (the principle of
legal precedent). Moreover, and alarmingly, the process of ISDS is becoming
corrupted, with high-priced law ﬁrms and professional arbitrators working with
third-party hedge-fund investors who back ISDS cases for proﬁt. The system is
evolving into a kind of extortion racket against the host governments of
developing countries, with the hedge funds, law ﬁrms, and arbitrators, sharing a
growing pot of awards.
The ostensible motivation of the current system is that all foreign direct
investment (FDI) is good for developing countries. Therefore, it is argued,
developing countries should welcome opportunities to signal their
determination to maintain pro-investor policies. ISDS is a kind of enforcement
mechanism that prevents backsliding a ter investors sink their money into
investments. The problem, of course, is that not all FDI is good, not by a
longshot. When foreign investment wrecks the environment, circumvents the
rights of indigenous communities, pays negligible taxes on rights to minerals
and other valuable natural resources, or abuses the rights of communities and
workers, then the FDI should be curbed, or forced to comply with the strictures
of sustainable development and other international obligations. Yet ISDS is
precisely undermining the regulation of such harmful practices.
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More generally, investors should not be protected from – never mind
compensated for – government measures of broad application, taken in good
faith to address public policy concerns. Such a perverse system distorts
government accountability, prioritizing the concerns and interests of companies
– and their proﬁts – over citizens and the environment.
This volume urges the redesign of global investment law on the basis of core
purposes, most importantly the promotion of sustainable development and
human rights. Speciﬁcally, how should investment treaties be redesigned to
support the Sustainable Development Goals, Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and the UN Convention
to Combat Desertiﬁcation (UNCCD)), as well as international human rights law?
The volume o fers a solid foundation for possible future reforms, by
emphasizing core principles of international law (including transparency,
accountability, voice, subsidiarity, and reciprocity of responsibilities), a
tightening of the possible bases for companies to make claims vis-à-vis
governments, a limitation on the size of damages, and perhaps even the
elimination of ISDS entirely, turning the responsibility for adjudication of
international investment law over to domestic courts of host countries.
With FDI a vital part of the world economy, and with the challenges of
sustainable development rapidly becoming the preeminent challenges of global
economic governance, this volume is timely, smart, and successful in deepening
the global debate over international investment law. It will be a key reference
point for scholars, development practitioners, international organizations, and
civil society activists around the world.
Je frey Sachs 
Special Advisor to the UN Secretary General  
on the Sustainable Development Goals 
New York, 8 August 2018
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4. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Roughly USD 3.9 trillion in investment is needed each year to achieve the
globally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); current expenditures
barely reach a third of that value, leaving a yawning USD 2.5 trillion investment
gap. In order to achieve those SDGs, governments need to strategically and
conscientiously engage and leverage private sector resources and strengths.
Critically, governments’ ability to leverage and regulate the private sector to
fulﬁll the SDGs is substantially determined by an international legal framework
of more than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs). These
agreements govern the  low of foreign capital and enumerate beneﬁts for
private investors and corresponding obligations for host governments. Most IIAs
follow a simple chain of logic: foreign investment is necessary to promote
development, and a favorable and stable legal environment is necessary to
promote foreign investment.
If only reality were so simple. To be clear, foreign investment can lead to
improved development outcomes through infrastructure, employment, tax
revenues, technology transfer, and other economic linkages. But these are in no
way automatic results of foreign investment. Rather, the ability of states to
beneﬁt from foreign investment depends directly on their ability to attract the
right kinds of investments, and the tools they have to leverage and regulate
investments.
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This book aims to serve as a practical resource for those interested in the
elements of an international investment system that promotes sustainable
development and achieves legitimacy by providing beneﬁts to all stakeholders.
This is a departure from the way that the regime is currently conceived by its
proponents as a system to provide investor beneﬁts in the hope that those
beneﬁts will spill over to others.
The objective of this book is to change the terms of the debate so that societal
values and goals are at the center of discussions about each reform proposal and
process. This book rethinks international investment law as a key system in
global economic governance that should incorporate principles of transparency,
participation, reciprocity, accountability, and subsidiarity. The book critically
evaluates the current system of investment governance in light of those
principles and goals. And ﬁnally, it proposes possible reforms – including
multilateral reforms – that would realign the governance of international
investment with 21st century goals including reduction of poverty and
inequality, and protection of human dignity, the environment, and the planet.
Achieving such reforms will require:
> A change to policy debates around international investment law to
genuinely and robustly address justice and governance concerns as
central to policy debates throughout the international investment ﬁeld.
> A change to the institutional actors who formulate, implement and
enforce investment law, to include a far broader range of institutional
actors in order to ensure that values such as sustainable development,
human rights, and environmental justice are put at the heart of
international investment law.
> A more consistent public engagement with the current international
investment regime, to create a more globalized and persistent
investment governance movement, making a compelling case to
policymakers for more substantive and radical reform.
Executive Summary
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In conclusion, this book argues that the current widespread dissatisfaction with
the international investment regime is no surprise in light of its lack of
alignment with the global challenges of the 21st century. Even in purely
economic terms, the case for the current international investment regime is
hardly robust. This is unfortunate because well-governed international
investment can be a powerful tool for sustainable development.
Executive Summary
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5. INTRODUCTION
"Something is rotten in the state of Denmark," or rather, in the international
investment legal regime, and the smell can no longer be concealed.
The current regime consists of international investment agreements (IIAs) that
allow foreign investors to go beyond traditional investment protection goals to
use o f-shore arbitration processes to claim compensation for losses. The
presence of such agreements can undermine a state's ability to pursue
legitimate public policy aims. These claims can run into billions of dollars –
sometimes substantial fractions of the revenues of the governments required to
pay them. Moreover, the system as currently structured does not engage
meaningfully with contemporary sustainable development challenges.
The broad-based discontent with the current regime can be heard from the
streets to the meeting chambers of venerable international institutions. As
countries learn the potential costs of the current regime, they are increasingly
reluctant to participate in it. While some reform processes are underway, they
fail to deeply engage with the system's fundamental  laws or seize the
opportunity to chart a new way forward. Treaties that seek to truly reorient
investment towards broader social and environmental goals are not on the
political agenda. At the same time, certain states have begun terminating
international investment agreements.
This book aims to serve as a practical resource for governments, foreign
investors, civil society actors, and other stakeholders interested in developing an
Introduction
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international investment system that promotes sustainable development and
achieves legitimacy by providing beneﬁts to all stakeholders.
The 2030 Agenda recognizes that international capital  lows, including foreign
direct investment and the activities of multinational enterprises, are essential to
achieving the Goals. The jobs which can be created by foreign direct investment,
the technologies it can transfer, broader spillovers it can generate, products and
services it produces, and tax revenue it can provide, are core ingredients for
achieving the Agenda. However, the contributions of FDI (and other forms of
capital  lows) are not always positive. FDI may undermine progress in discrete
locations (e.g, an MNE violating labor standards) and/or even globally (as might
be the case for a company seeking to expand development of fossil fuel
reserves).
In light of these issues, this book explores how the protection of foreign investors
may a fect the abilities of governments to address the economic, social, and
environmental dimensions of sustainable development. The book also provides
examples of tensions in the current regime with achieving the sustainable
development goals. A tripartite solution is suggested.
First, the book recommends a paradigm shi t. Instead of attempting to design a
better regime of legal instruments whose central aim is to promote and protect
foreign direct investment (FDI), this book rethinks international investment
law as a key system in global economic governance. This governance system
should incorporate principles of transparency, participation, reciprocity,
accountability, and subsidiarity.
Second, guided by these principles, the book proposes concrete reforms aimed
at rebalancing the rights of international investors and host states.
Finally, it proposes possible reforms - including multilateral ones – that would
realign the governance of international investment with 21st-century goals,
including the reduction of poverty and inequality and the protection of human
dignity and the environment.
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6.
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
LAW:  
AN OVERVIEW
6.1 INVESTMENT
LIBERALIZATION AND
PROTECTION
At the end of World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom shaped
the Bretton Woods agreements that established the Western post-war
international economic order. Institutions such as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) re lected
the economic power and preferences of the United States and the United
Kingdom. Over time, these institutions fostered the post-war recovery of
European allies and helped boost the economic strength of the Western
industrialized countries. Many now-developing countries were still colonies at
the time; as a result, they had no say in the shape of the postwar economic order.
Beginning in the 1980s, the United States and some other industrialized
countries promoted the so-called Washington Consensus, a suite of market-
oriented policies that included liberalization of trade and international
investment and privatization of state-owned enterprises. These policies
accelerated economic globalization. The 1980s debt crisis in Latin America, the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the 1997/8 Asian ﬁnancial crisis resulted in
regional adoption of pro-market policies that led a huge swath of countries to
pursue neoliberal economic policies. The gradual opening of the Chinese
economy in the late 1970s under Deng Xiaoping ultimately led to Chinese
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accession to the World Trade Organization in December 2001. The integration of
China into the global trading system assisted its spectacular economic rise,
li ting over 300 million Chinese out of poverty. A number of formerly developing
countries also entered the ranks of middle-income countries.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the shi t in economic power, the rise of Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS), and the relative decline of the
United States and United Kingdom, helped to give voice to criticism of the
multilateral institutions that were legacies of Bretton Woods and the
Washington Consensus version of globalization. Dissatisfaction increased as
Asian countries were forced to borrow from the IMF in the wake of the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis, and the IMF imposed austerity policies as a condition for lending.
The resultant required draconian cuts in government spending harmed citizen
welfare. Other developing countries have similarly protested other measures
such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), which held the price of critical drugs high
while the HIV/AIDS crisis caused millions of needless deaths in the early 2000s.
Multilateral institutions also faced strong pushback against e forts to establish
rules on investment liberalization and protection. For example, the Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), incorporated into the WTO during the Uruguay round,
were perceived as weak from the point of view of foreign investors seeking
expansive rights of establishment and the elimination of restrictions on foreign
investment. Dissatisﬁed with the result, capital-exporting states continued to
push for an agreement that would have more bite. The Multilateral Agreement
on Investment was a plurilateral attempt among the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries to cra t a multilateral treaty
that would give signiﬁcant protections for foreign investors. The negotiations
were conducted in secret between 1995 and 1998, until divisions between the US
and European countries, and an energized civil society protest campaign,
brought the negotiations to a halt.
In the face of multilateral stalemate, the industrialized countries pursued a
vertical forum-shi ting strategy and engaged in bilateral, regional, and
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plurilateral negotiations, to seek agreements on a range of topics that could not
be achieved at the multilateral level.
The shi t to vertical agreements allowed stronger parties to more e fectively
leverage their economic power over weaker parties and to negotiate better deals
than they could achieve at the multilateral level. One result has been a huge
spike in the number of bilateral, regional, and plurilateral investment
agreements.
DIAGRAM Number of IIAs
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Thousands of bilateral investment treaties have been signed since the mid-
1990s, and there have been a number of signiﬁcant negotiations at the regional
and plurilateral levels. These include early regional agreements, such as the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, 1994) and sectoral agreements
such as the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT, 1998), and, more recently, texts such as:
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Comprehensive Investment
Agreement (2009); the 12-country Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Agreement (TPP,
2016), which subsequently became the 11-country Comprehensive and
Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (CPTPP, 2018); the Protocol
for Cooperation and Facilitation of Intra-MERCOSUR Investments (2017); the
Paciﬁc Agreement on Closer Economic Relations (PACER) Plus (2017); and the
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) (launched in
2012 with negotiations continuing into 2018).
While many investment treaties owe their origin to power asymmetries among
negotiating parties, with capital-exporting states seeking to impose strong
investor protection obligations on capital-importing states, there has also been a
view among at least some of those capital-importing countries that foreign
direct investment would bring economic growth, and that the investment
treaties could be useful, if not necessary, tools in attracting such investment.
International Investment Law: An overview
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6.2 CURRENT TRENDS
Today, some states (and their citizens) are pushing back against investment
protection treaties. One key criticism is that the treaties are overly favorable to
investors and overly restrictive for domestic regulatory autonomy. As an aspect
of deep economic integration, investment treaties reach far into domestic
regulatory regimes and may constrain a country's ability to regulate for
environmental, social and economic objectives. Another mounting concern is
that the treaties fail to deliver hoped-for beneﬁts in terms of foreign direct
investment promotion (and subsequent economic growth). A number of states,
including Brazil and South Africa, have consequently rejected the IIA and the
investor-state dispute settlement approach. Indeed, even long-time supporters
of investment treaties and their investor-state dispute settlement provisions
have recently changed course and highlighted concerns with those agreements.
In 2017, the United States announced it would seek to excise the investor-state
dispute settlement from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
and in 2015, the European Commission declared that an investor-state dispute
settlement is not suited to resolution of investment treaty disputes, and it began
publicly pursuing development of alternative models.
But while IIAs and investor-state dispute settlement provisions have gained new
foes, they have also apparently secured some new allies. In particular, China is
signing IIAs with more countries each year, and countries with large sovereign
wealth funds like the UAE have also recently been intensifying their pursuit of
such treaties.
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DIAGRAM China v. Rest of BRICS Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows 2000-
2016 (in USD Billion)
Source: UNCTAD
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6.3 CRITICISMS OF THE
CURRENT REGIME
The current international investment law regime has been criticised for a range
of reasons. This chapter identiﬁes some of the key critiques but is not meant to
be exhaustive.
International Investment Agreements (IIAs)
Each state is free to negotiate its own international investment agreements. But
there is o ten a misconception about the nature of investment treaties. Such
treaties have long been seen as instruments of economic diplomacy, and o ten
they have been signed in the margin of a bilateral diplomatic visit, without the
involvement of key actors such as labor unions, civil society, and others. The
process of designing investment treaties is still generally not inclusive enough to
ensure that treaties being negotiated will serve the best interests of the state
and people.
All international agreements impinge, to some extent, on a state's sovereign
powers. Few international agreements, however, intrude as powerfully into a
state’s ability to regulate as do IIAs. International Investment Agreements give
foreign investors (but not domestic investors or other constituents) the ability to
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challenge conduct by host states, including laws and policies governing a range
of public interest issues (such as tax policies, labor laws, and environmental
laws).
For instance, the "fair and equitable treatment" (FET) standard has emerged as
the provision most frequently invoked by investors in legal cases. It has also been
the most common basis for successful claims. FET provisions have been
interpreted by investment tribunals to include a right to a "stable and
predictable regulatory environment" that does not frustrate investors'
"legitimate expectations." Given the vague nature of the words "fair" and
"equitable," and the varying interpretations given to the FET concept by
tribunals, it is exceedingly di ﬁcult for governments and others to know what
the standard requires or when it has been breached. This can lead to a "chill" or
restraint on the formulation and/or exercise of government regulatory power. It
also can generate unnecessary and undesirable litigation.
Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. The United Mexican
States (2003) provides an example of a tribunal’s interpretation of fair
and equitable treatment that severely constricts a government’s rights to
act. This case was brought under a bilateral investment treaty between
Mexico and Spain. The investor, Tecnicas Medioambientales, was awarded
US$ 5.5 million in 2003 when renewal of the license for a hazardous
waste facility was denied for environmental reasons. The tribunal said
that fair and equitable treatment requires the government “to act in a
consistent manner, free from ambiguity and totally transparently in its
relations with the foreign investor, so that it may know beforehand any
and all rules and regulations that will govern its investments,” concluding
that the lack of fair and equitable treatment amounted to indirect
expropriation.
These broad protections are available to a wide range of foreign investors and
investments. The deﬁnition of an investor eligible for protection is so broad that
a foreign investor can gain the beneﬁts of a treaty by simply incorporating an
entity in the home country, without any substantive business activity or
management control in that country. The result is that investors can shop for
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treaties that are most investor-friendly. Additionally, foreign investments can
beneﬁt from treaty protection irrespective of whether that investment
contributes to sustainable development in the host country.
The case Philip Morris Asia Limited v. Australia (2012) exempliﬁes the
temptations of treaty shopping. In November 2011 Australia enacted the
Tobacco Plain Packaging Act. Until February of 2011, Philip Morrris
Australia had been owned by its Swiss parent, Philip Morris International.
However, Philip Morris Asia, based in Hong Kong, suddenly acquired all of
the shares of Philip Morris Australia so that it could ﬁle an investor
complaint against Australia. As a result of the acquisition, Philip Morris
was able to rely on the Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty
(BIT) to assert investor rights and claim that the regulation a fected its
investment, Philip Morris Australia. Without shi ting its investment,
Philip Morris would not have been able to challenge the Australian
regulation because there is no BIT between Switzerland and Australia.
This move backﬁred, however, and the tribunal found that Philip Morris'
hasty restructuring to avail itself of the Hong Kong-Australia BIT
constituted an abuse of process. Nevertheless, the tribunal in this case and
in others seem to have converged around the view that it is
“uncontroversial that the mere fact of restructuring an investment to
obtain BIT beneﬁts is not per se illegitimate,” but that such treaty
shopping may not be permitted if done to gain treaty protection to help
resolve a speciﬁc dispute that has already arisen or is foreseeable (para
540). Australia also had to bear signiﬁcant costs, not covered by the
investor, for defending the case.
Issues with international investment agreements are exacerbated by their
interactions with investment contracts. By virtue of the umbrella clauses in IIAs,
contractual obligations become "internationalized," therefore giving investors
the right to claim under both IIAs and investment contracts. This situation has in
some instances resulted in parallel proceedings that could a fect regime
consistency and allow the investor to pursue multiple claims against the state in
di ferent venues. More generally, IIAs and ISDS permit investors to pursue
contract-related claims against the state in multiple fora.
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Following the 2007 expropriations of their heavy crude oil projects in
Venezuela, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips pursued cases under ICSID,
pursuant to the bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and
Venezuela. Both investors also ﬁled ICC cases for the same expropriations
against PDVSA, the Venezuelan state-owned petroleum company, under
arbitration provisions in their contractual arrangements. Similarly,
following the denial of a mining license in 2011, the Australian subsidiary
of Barrick Gold and Antofagasta ﬁled an ICSID case against Pakistan
under the Australia-Pakistan bilateral investment treaty and a parallel
case against the province Balochistan under ICC rules and arbitration
provisions in an investment contract.
IIAs therefore grant extensive rights to a wide range of foreign investors against
host states. They do so without imposing any reciprocal obligations on those
investors. Where broader concerns such as human rights or sustainable
development are included within IIAs, they do not, for the most part, demand
action from investors or states. As a result, the legal framework for investment
operates on an understanding of justice where fairness to investors is the
dominant principle.
Investor-State Dispute Settlement
Investor-State Dispute Settlement is the system through which investors can sue
countries for alleged treaty breaches in front of panels of international
arbitrators. When claims are successful, damages in individual cases can
amount to hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars, which can be a huge
ﬁnancial burden for states, particularly smaller developing countries, or
countries facing ﬁnancial crises. Even if countries successfully defend cases, they
can be le t with millions of dollars of legal bills and su fer long-term
reputational costs.
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In the dispute between Tethyan Copper v. Pakistan (2012) in the Reko Diq
project, the claimants are reportedly asking for damages in the amount of
US$11.5 billion. The claim is based on the denial of a mining license to the
claimants, who contended that they had invested around US$500 million
in the purchase of the rights and in exploration and related activities
which the mining operation had not established. In 2018, when the
damages portion of the case was being heard, Pakistan's foreign exchange
holdings amounted to less than US$18 billion, while the annual federal
budget was around US$40 billion. The claimants are also seeking
damages from the provincial Balochistan government. Balochistan is
Pakistan's poorest and least populous province, with more than half the
population living below the poverty line and an annual government
budget of around US$3 billion. This claim is still in progress.
Until the early 2000s, investors only infrequently turned to ISDS to resolve
investment disputes with host states. However, since then, investors have
increasingly relied on expansive interpretations of vaguely-dra ted provisions in
IIAs, national investment laws, investment contracts, and the dispute resolution
provisions contained within such agreements, to sue host states for alleged
violations of treaty or contractual obligations. This practice of "contract, treaty
and forum shopping" has contributed to the multiplication of ISDS cases.
Litigants place their court cases in the court system perceived most likely to ﬁnd
in their favor. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the whole ISDS system has been
a fected and put into question.
The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) are the two primary institutional hosts for
international investment arbitrations. Each organization o fers some secretariat
and administrative support, and in certain cases will appoint a third arbitrator if
the arbitrators for competing parties cannot agree. The most commonly used
arbitration rules to govern the cases are produced by ICSID and the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). While there are
important di ferences in these rules and institutions, all have been critiqued on
various issues including their approaches to transparency, third party rights
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(although this has started to change), systems for adjudicator appointment, and
a lack of regulations against the involvement of third-party funding.
There are limited grounds for reviewing arbitral awards. In the case of ICSID,
awards can be annulled only on very limited grounds. Since 2011, only 3% of
cases have been annulled (ICSID Background paper on annulment, 2016).
Awards issued under the auspices of other arbitral institutions can be
challenged before domestic courts also on narrow grounds. But overall, under no
circumstances can awards be challenged for inconsistency or incorrectness.
Divergent interpretation by arbitral tribunals of identical treaty clauses has led
to a fragmentation of ISDS case law, thereby undermining the conﬁdence of
many countries in the system. This lack of conﬁdence has been exacerbated by
the fact that cases are litigated and decided by a small professional community
of arbitrators and counsels who generally hail from western countries and elite
socio-economic backgrounds. Furthermore, the systematic use of ISDS has
excluded national courts from the process of hearing disputes involving public
law/policy matters.
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6.4 CONCLUSION
Investment treaties have been signed between states for many years. However,
in the period since the 1990s, the numbers of investment treaties have expanded
greatly. As they have become more proliﬁc, IIAs have also faced increasing
criticism from states, civil society and a range of other actors. IIAs grant
extensive rights to investors and intrude into the sovereign powers of states and
their rights to regulate. At the same time, they empower investors to bring cases
through a troubling ISDS process that regularly awards large sums of damages.
The concerns identiﬁed in this chapter are compounded when considering the
evidence to support the economic case for IIAs, which has been traditionally
used to justify this strong system of enforcement of investors' property rights.
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7. AN ECONOMIC
CASE FOR
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
AGREEMENTS?
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Many claim that IIAs are economic policy tools that promote FDI. This chapter
provides a succinct analysis of the economic arguments in support of IIAs. While
the focus of the analysis is the host country perspective, this chapter also
considers investors' home countries' interests.
The bottom line is that there is a possible case that IIAs a fect FDI  lows, but even
this does not create a clear economic case for investment treaties. On the one
hand, there is some evidence that investors and host states both believe that
IIAs enhance the legal environment for foreign investment in host states, and
that if these host states do not have IIAs, transactions may be more costly. On
the other hand, the fundamental theoretical argument for IIAs is not strong, and
the empirical evidence that IIAs promote FDI is complicated. Most importantly,
there are strong reasons to shi t the focus of the economic debate away from the
aggregate FDI  lows that IIAs might support.
In short, economic analysis supports the claim that the governance of
international investment needs rethinking if it is to meet its potential to
deliver broad-based economic beneﬁts.
Before analyzing the economic case for IIAs, it is important to brie ly introduce
the economics of the FDI that they are supposed to promote.
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Why and Where Does Foreign Investment
Happen?
International investment occurs for a variety of reasons. These include: reducing
costs (including labor); accessing natural resources (including fossil fuels, rare
minerals, and arable farmland); capturing strategic assets (including
technologies and brands), and accessing markets (including platforms for
production close to markets). Market-seeking FDI will  low preferentially to the
largest markets – o ten those with higher incomes and/or larger populations.
Resource-seeking and asset-seeking FDI will  low to countries that have the
resources and assets investors seek, and production cost-saving FDI will  low to
countries in which the cost of labor or operations are low relative to productivity.
These categories of FDI map, therefore, to the size and other characteristics of
the host country.
Government policies can also have an impact on investment  lows. Tax policies,
particularly those providing preferential treatment of foreign ﬁrms – may attract
more FDI. Other factors claimed to a fect FDI attractiveness include the quality
of domestic legal institutions, the quality of infrastructure, trade openness, and
ﬁnancial integration.
What Impact Does Foreign Investment Have
on the Host State?
Most governments in the world seek to encourage foreign direct investment
because of the many beneﬁts it is believed to bring. The possible beneﬁts of FDI
include a transfer of knowledge and technology, tax revenue, foreign ﬁnance,
greater connection to global value chains, expanded employment, higher wages
and export earnings.
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Foreign investment does, however, have some potential downsides. Some
investors, for instance, exploit both workers and natural resources, drive out
local businesses, and use their substantial market power to extract excess
proﬁts.
The balance of these positive and negative impacts depends on a combination of
the host company's characteristics (such as population, level of development,
and quality of institutions), policies, and the type of investment.
DIAGRAM Impacts and drivers of FDI
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7.2 HOST STATE PERSPECTIVE
Countries all over the world promote their economies as attractive destinations
for FDI in order to generate beneﬁts such as tax revenue, job creation, transfer of
technology and know-how. Developing countries, in particular, are encouraged
to attract FDI in order to realize economic beneﬁts. Though they may participate
in these agreements for diplomatic reasons, the raison d'etre for IIAs is
economic: to encourage inbound FDI.
What Is the Theory of Why IIAs Should Attract
FDI?
When companies make international investment decisions, one of the factors
they consider is political risk. Political risk arises from the fact that host
government actions can negatively (or positively) a fect the proﬁtability of a
company’s investment. Host governments vary in the predictability of their
policy and regulatory environments and in the quality, e fectiveness, and
independence of their legal systems. Hosts that have unpredictable policies or
unreliable legal systems may fail to attract the level of foreign investment that
they desire. Some argue that investors may be hesitant to invest for two reasons.
The ﬁrst is that foreign investors su fer a "liability of foreignness." The argument
is that foreign investors are politically disenfranchised (they do not have the
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right to vote) and lack close familial or personal connections to government. As a
result, host governments are biased against them as compared to domestic
actors. This bias, if it exists, can lead to the regulatory environment being
prejudiced against foreign investors in order to provide an advantage to
domestic competitors. Bias towards domestic constituents could also lead to so-
called "over-regulation" of the company's activities. For example, environmental
regulations may be too stringent because the costs of these to the foreign
investor are ignored.
The second argument made by proponents of IIAs is that there is an "obsolescing
bargain" between the host and the foreign investor. The basic argument is that
before the investor makes their investment, the host has an incentive to o fer
excellent conditions in order to encourage the investment. Once the investment
has occurred, the investor usually has "sunk costs." That is, the investor has
incurred some costs that cannot be recovered if it withdraws from the country.
The presence of these sunk costs means that the investor is unlikely to shut-
down or pull out from the country, even if the government makes some changes
that are unfavorable to it. The argument goes that host governments exploit this
and routinely make changes post-investment that shi t the distribution of
beneﬁts toward it and away from the investor.
International investment treaties – particularly those that include investor-state
arbitration – can help formalize a host government’s commitment to sustaining
their policies toward an investment in ways that are favorable to the investor. For
example, if a government tries to nationalize part of an investment, the investor
can threaten to bring a dispute to investor-state dispute settlement. If the threat
of a dispute does not change the government’s policy, then the investor may
choose to bring the dispute to arbitration and may successfully win
compensation for part or all of its losses. This combination, of deterring adverse
government actions and providing some insurance in the case that an adverse
action occurs, lowers the expected losses from political risk (Aisbett, Busse,
Nunnenkamp, 2017). In some cases, the resulting increase in expected
proﬁtability can make the di ference between whether an investment occurs or
not. As a result, more investment should  low to the host country than it would
in the absence of an IIA.
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Some commentators have also suggested that participating in investment
treaties might act as a signal to investors that the host government is o fering a
favorable investment climate. While a desire to signal this intention may be one
of the motivations for host governments to participate in these agreements,
neither economic theory nor empirical evidence particularly supports this idea.
In particular, if participation in agreements is being used to act as a signal of a
favorable investment climate, only countries with favorable investment climates
should participate in them. The empirical pattern of agreement participation is,
however, quite di ferent. Countries with favorable investment climates do not
have as much need to sign treaties in order to attract more investment.
Why Might IIAs Not Actually Increase
Investment Flows?
A primary reason that international investment treaties might have little e fect
on FDI  lows is that the need for these agreements is less than their proponents
claim.
First, while the regulatory framework of a host country can be enabling, the
economic determinants are key, including available resources, infrastructure,
technology, markets, skills, and costs.
Second, the argument that there is greater systematic bias against foreign
companies than there is against domestic actors is questionable. The revenue-
generating potential of foreign investments is likely to mean that they are
naturally given priority over concerns that have less money attached to them,
including environmental protection or the protection of marginalized
communities.
A recent paper by Aisbett and Poulsen (2016) also provides evidence that foreign
companies are – if anything – treated more favorably than similar domestic
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companies. Furthermore, the extent of this favorable treatment was found to be
greatest in the poorest countries.
The theoretical basis of the obsolescing-bargain argument is also questionable.
The obsolescing-bargain argument holds in the situation where the government
does not care about its reputation or expect any future interactions with the
investor. The reality, however, is that host governments which are trying to
attract foreign investment care a great deal about their reputations and hope
that existing investors will invest more in the future. The host will not change its
treatment of the investor simply because costs have been sunk. The bargain
between host and investor does not obsolesce. In this case, the investment
agreement has no e fect on FDI  lows because it is a tool to solve a problem that
did not exist.
Another reason that IIAs may not cause substantive increases in investment
 lows may be the existence of alternative mechanisms to protect investors.
These mechanisms include strong contractual protections (such as pledges over
government assets), government guarantees, and political risk insurance. These
mechanisms are very popular in large infrastructure project ﬁnance and public-
private partnership transactions.
What Is the Evidence that IIAs Attract More
Foreign Investment?
Numerous studies have used econometrics (specialized statistical techniques) to
try to test whether participating in investment agreements leads to an increase
in the amount of foreign direct investment entering the country. There have also
been multiple reviews of this literature (Sauvant & Sachs, 2009; Pohl, 2018). The
reviews show that the studies o ten ﬁnd con licting results. The inconsistencies
arise both from di ferences in data and di ferent methods of analysis.
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Some broad patterns do emerge across the empirical studies of the link between
participation in IIAs and foreign investment  lows. As a general rule, the
correlation between participation in the agreements and investment  lows is
greatest for the eastern European states during the 1990s. The problem with this
is that the 1990s was a period of enormous change in these economies. The fall
of the Iron Curtain resulted in a revival of economic ties with western countries
that until then had been prohibited.
For African states, the correlation between treaty participation and investment
 lows tends to be the weakest. The recent study by Aisbett et al. (2017) also ﬁnds
that the investment-promoting impacts of participation in a treaty are
conditional on the host never having been the target of an investment claim.
Of course, all of these empirical studies are only as good as the data on which
they rely. A recent study by the OECD provides an excellent discussion of the
limitations of this data and its implications for the reliability of the ﬁndings of
the studies (Pohl, 2018 and "What Does FDI Actually Measure" box below).
Is the Focus on FDI Flows Justiﬁed?
The relationship between participation in IIAs and investment  lows has been
the focus of much of the policy debate as well as the academic literature. There
are, however, several arguments against focusing only on the value of
investment  lows.
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DIAGRAM Long and short pathways to sustainable development
Primary amongst these is that the real interests of host states revolve not around
the foreign investment itself but rather around the tax revenue, development,
jobs, and positive spillovers that foreign investment can - but does not
necessarily - bring. Realizing these beneﬁts depends on host government
policies, investment characteristics, and the tools available to attract, leverage,
shape, and regulate investments.
For some governments, for whom infrastructure investments are a priority, IIAs
are perceived as helpful, not necessarily or only for attracting investment  lows,
but for reducing the need for government securities and international
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investment insurance for infrastructure investments. IIAs are perceived to
reduce the cost of insuring the investor against political risk, which, in major
project ﬁnance transactions would typically increase the cost of borrowing for
the host state.
There are other reasons to caution against using impacts on FDI  lows as the
measure of whether IIA participation is good policy. Economic theory shows that
it is possible that IIAs generate too much foreign investment, to the detriment of
the host state. For example, Aisbett, Karp, and McAusland (2010) show that by
providing protections to foreign investors that are not available to domestic
investors, IIAs can allow foreign investors to crowd out more e ﬁcient domestic
investment.
IIAs may also encourage the wrong investments. Aisbett, Karp, and McAusland
argue that the implicit insurance provided by IIAs to foreign investors against
host regulatory changes is most valuable to ﬁrms investing in industries that are
most likely to be regulated. Industries that have the potential to cause
signiﬁcant social or environmental harm are, of course, among the most heavily
regulated. As a result, IIAs can lead to over-investment in the industries most
likely to cause harm, potentially crowding out investment in industries that
bring net beneﬁts to the host. This reminds us that the objective of the host
state is not to increase FDI per se, but rather to attract foreign investments that
will bring net beneﬁts.
Finally, IIAs can also a fect the beneﬁts that a host can obtain from a particular
amount of foreign investment. Many IIAs contain provisions that explicitly
prohibit the host from placing so-called performance requirements on investors.
The performance requirements placed on investing ﬁrms by host governments
are typically aimed at obtaining more beneﬁts for the host. They include such
requirements as employing local sta f, using local materials, or exporting a
minimum percentage of the ﬁrm's output.
IIAs can also reduce the beneﬁts a host government receives from an investment
in less direct ways. For example, the implicit threat that the host can expropriate
or nationalize an investment increases the bargaining power of the host in
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negotiations over the division of the beneﬁts of the ﬁrm's production – such as
tax rates and royalties (Markusen, 2001). By removing this implicit threat, IIAs
shi t the bargaining power – and hence share of the beneﬁts – toward the
investor and away from the host.
Perhaps the most controversial way in which IIAs may be harmful to hosts,
despite increasing investment  lows, is by reducing the host's ability to change
regulatory policies in response to new information. The recent debate about
reforming the international investment regime has been motivated, in no small
part, by the need to safeguard host countries' right to alter general regulatory
policies in areas such as health, safety, and the environment, despite such
changes having secondary e fects on foreign investors. In many instances, host
states have been brought before international arbitration tribunals for such
measures despite their being adopted for valid and non-investor-speciﬁc
reasons. From that perspective, it can be argued that IIAs, if not reformed, may
lead to a chilling e fect on host country regulation.
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What does FDI Data Actually Measure?
In order to understand and manage FDI, it is important to measure it. Indeed,
policymakers pay much attention to ﬁgures revealing how well their countries
are doing in attracting such investment. However, gross FDI data do not
distinguish between "productive" and "non-productive" FDI, nor do they
distinguish accurately between investments over which foreign management
in luence exists and those where it is minimal or absent. Moreover, the data is not
as good as it ought to be in determining the origin of FDI  lows.
The standard approach to measuring FDI is to count it as those investments in
which the foreign investor owns at least 10% of the voting power of the
investment enterprise. But the data on how much FDI is  lowing across borders,
where it is going, and what it is doing, may not be producing a meaningful
picture.
For one thing, the 10% threshold may fail to capture some cases when the
investor owns a smaller share of a foreign enterprise, but exercises control over
that company. In addition, it may be overinclusive, capturing cases when the
investor's shareholding, while over 10%, does not provide control or signiﬁcant
in luence.
Another issue is that while data on FDI is meant to represent the amount and
location of real and lasting commitments in foreign enterprises, FDI o ten
behaves like portfolio investment,  lowing in and out of ﬁrms with relative ease
and speed. FDI can, for instance, include transactions when one company in one
country lends to its a ﬁliate in another country. Those types of intra-ﬁrm
arrangements can be used by companies to take advantage of di ferent interest
and exchange rates across borders, but o ten do not represent the types of sticky
investments FDI is generally thought to represent.
Similarly, FDI may not represent investment in actual productive activities. It can
include, for example, establishment of a company in a tax haven, with FDI in that
company being made in order to shield money from tax assessments.
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A ﬁnal issue is that data on the source and destination of FDI is o ten misleading.
If, for example, a Chinese company establishes a subsidiary in Hong Kong and
then uses that company to send investment back into China, data may include as
FDI both the investment from China to Hong Kong, and then from Hong Kong to
China.
DIAGRAM Intra-company FDI
Similarly, if the Chinese investor establishes a "mailbox company" in Hong Kong,
and that Hong Kong ﬁrm establishes a wholly-owned manufacturing a ﬁliate in
Malaysia, data might include as FDI both the Chinese investment into Hong
Kong, and the investment from Hong Kong to Malaysia, even though there is just
one FDI project – an investment by a Chinese investor in a manufacturing
company in Malaysia.
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7.3 HOME STATE PERSPECTIVE
Over the last decade, the world has seen an increasing  low of capital from
di ferent regions and within regions. Trade integration has allowed countries to
become more stable and more resilient to changes in external conditions. This
process has encouraged investors to pursue new destinations abroad, seeking
proﬁts while managing risk. It has also reinforced the incentive of capital-
exporting states to ensure that their nationals investing abroad enjoy a certain
level of treatment by host governments. There are several views on why home
states have been so pro-active in supporting the regime.
One argument is that outward investing ﬁrms are politically powerful and able
to convince governments that what is good for them is good for the country.
A second argument used to explain the enthusiasm of home states for IIAs is the
"de-politicization" of investment disputes. In the absence of an international
method of settling disputes between investors and their host governments,
investors turn to their home governments for support. Home governments can
be under domestic political pressure to support their investors abroad, but this
can come at a cost to foreign policy goals. It is better, home governments o ten
believe, to be able to tell the investor that there is an international system to
which it can turn for support. (In fact, however, investors still try to enlist support
from the home government embassy.)
Costs resulting from home government help in resolving investment disputes
can also be economic. The Japanese government, for example, has intervened to
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support its investors by providing ﬁnancial assistance to the host government.
Investment treaties are attractive to home governments in shi ting the problem
of resolving disputes to international arbitration. (In fact, Japanese ﬁrms resist
international arbitration and still turn to their home government.)
There are, however, potential costs to home states arising from IIAs. These
agreements can, in fact, make FDI more favorable than domestic investment. An
IIA provides broad protections and may encourage "regulatory chill" in a host
country. If comparable protections are not available to the investor in their home
country, these beneﬁts may, in fact, advantage FDI in relation to domestic
investment. In the case of adjoining countries, such as the United States and
Mexico, regulatory chill resulting from an IIA can indirectly undermine
regulatory actions in the home country because of the potential for regulatory
arbitrage. In this sense, IIAs may act as an indirect subsidy of outward
investment.
From an e ﬁciency perspective, a home country policy toward FDI should be
neutral - that is, without direct or indirect subsidies. There may be policy reasons
to support certain types of outward investment, for instance, to support
technology transfer or to support other investments or outcomes consistent with
international commitments and cooperation.
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7.4 CONCLUSION
The above analysis leads to the following main conclusions:
First, the empirical evidence about the impact of IIAs on FDI  lows is not
conclusive.
Second, the focus on assessing the economic case for IIAs predominantly on
the basis of their impact on FDI  lows is misguided. The beneﬁts states are
looking for and the costs that are imposed are not measured by the volume of
FDI  lows but rather by the contribution of the FDI to national development
and any economic, social or environmental impacts of the investment.
Focusing solely on impacts of FDI  lows also fails to capture other impacts of
IIAs, for example in compromising policy space.
The problems identiﬁed in relation to IIAs in chapter 2, combined with the lack
of conclusive evidence of economic beneﬁt for IIAs in this chapter, should
prompt the rethinking of the investment law regime. These concerns are
exacerbated when thinking about international investment agreements from
the perspective of sustainable development.
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8. THE GLOBAL
INVESTMENT
REGIME AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
8.1 INTRODUCTION
Sustainable development, according to the United Nation's Brundtland Report,
is "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Sustainable development
is viewed as being comprised of three inter-related dimensions: economic,
social, and environmental.
Responding to these needs, the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
sets out the collective resolve of signatory countries to:
Further, the Agenda emphasizes "that the dignity of the human person is
fundamental," and that, while the aim is to see the 17 Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) and their associated "targets met for all nations and peoples and
for all segments of society," the priority is to "reach the furthest behind ﬁrst."
(2030 Agenda, para 4).
[E]nd poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among
countries; to build peaceful, just, and inclusive societies; to protect human rights
and promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to
ensure the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources. We resolve
also to create conditions for sustainable, inclusive, and sustained economic
growth, shared prosperity and decent work for all, taking into account di ferent
levels of national development and capacities. (2030 Agenda, para 3).
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DIAGRAM UN Sustainable Development Goals
The 2030 Agenda further recognizes that international capital  lows, including
foreign direct investment and the activities of multinational enterprises, are
essential to achieving the SDGs. The jobs foreign direct investment can create,
technologies it can transfer, broader spillovers it can generate, products and
services it produces, and tax revenue it can provide, are core ingredients for
achieving the Agenda. However, the contributions of FDI (and other forms of
capital  lows) are not always positive. FDI may undermine progress in discrete
locations (such as an MNE violating labor standards) and/or even globally (as
The Global Investment Regime and Sustainable Development
54
might be the case for a company seeking to expand development of fossil fuel
reserves).
In light of these issues, this section explores some of the intersections between
IIAs and sustainable development, focusing on how the protection of foreign
investors may a fect the abilities of governments to address the economic,
social, and environmental dimensions of sustainable development. This section
also provides examples of tensions between IIAs and some of the sustainable
development goals.
DIAGRAM Sustainable Development
This chapter builds on the economic analysis of the previous chapter and shows
that beyond the inconclusive economic beneﬁts of IIAs they may also contain
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provisions that constrain states from e fectively harnessing FDI to pursue
inclusive economic development. The chapter goes on to show that IIAs can also
limit the ability of governments to pursue social and environmental policies. The
chapter does not o fer a comprehensive analysis but rather presents examples to
illustrate broader themes, focusing on some of the problems with the status quo
system of investment protection.
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8.2 ECONOMIC DIMENSONS
Mobile Capital and Globalized Firms
Due to innovations in transport and technology and the proliferation of global
rules requiring governments to allow capital, goods, and services to  low freely
across their borders, companies have increasing freedom to structure their
operations in complex global networks. Corporate decisions about that
structure, including decisions regarding where to place production facilities, and
where to hold their assets and book their proﬁts, have important consequences
for economic inclusion. For instance, when a company locates new production
facilities in a host country, it can create jobs there. However, it may also use its
market power to gain unfair advantages. A multinational enterprise entering a
new host country may predatorily price out indigenous competitors and cause
large-scale layo fs that exacerbate local economic inequality.
Additionally, decisions on how to allocate assets, liabilities, and proﬁts across
borders can signiﬁcantly a fect how much tax is assessed and by whom. This, in
turn, impacts on the abilities of governments to provide public goods (such as
health care, infrastructure, and education) and safety nets needed for reducing
inequality.
There are some tools governments can use to try to ensure FDI leads to inclusive
economic growth. In addition to tax policy tools (discussed further below),
governments can, for instance, require that companies:
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> locate facilities in certain areas of the country with low rates of
employment;
> locate certain aspects of their operations in particular areas of the
country;
> source (or accord preferences to) local service providers (including
minority or historically disadvantaged groups) and;
> enable shared use of transport, power, and other infrastructure.
These provisions (o ten termed "performance requirements") are o ten critiqued
on the ground that they interfere with the decisions of companies about how to
most e ﬁciently and e fectively run their businesses. It is also o ten contended
that these tools may even be counterproductive for the host state's objectives as,
if too onerous, they can discourage companies from investing in the ﬁrst place.
Nevertheless, without such tools, governments may be unable to ensure that
FDI generates beneﬁts and that those beneﬁts are captured by a diverse range of
constituents.
A further challenge related to mobile capital is that governments o ten feel
compelled to provide potentially costly incentives in order to attract or keep
companies. By o fering incentives, the government may be able to attract
investment and create jobs beneﬁtting some, but those incentives (which can be
seen as tax expenditures) also represent a transfer of wealth with important
distributional implications.
Investment treaties at present risk exacerbating these issues. A growing number
of investment treaties contain liberalization requirements seeking to support
cross-border movement of ﬁrms and capital. Moreover, a growing number also
contain restrictions on performance requirements, preventing governments
from trying to capture and/or direct ﬁrms' potential positive spillovers.
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Focus on Tax Policy
The intersection between international investment law and tax policy is
particularly important for issues of inclusive economic development. Indeed,
achieving sustainable development goals relies critically on revenue
mobilization by capital-importing host countries.
National income tax systems have been under stress from globalization and
inter-nation tax competition to attract real investment as well as providing a
record of proﬁts. The prevalent use of tax incentives is in many cases
unproductive and wasteful, in that it rarely increases the total amount of
investment. International tax avoidance is a plague that undermines the ability
of developing countries to address revenue needs. While the G20 and OECD
have pushed forward a reform agenda to combat base erosion and proﬁt
shi ting (BEPS) by multinational ﬁrms, the BEPS project was circumscribed in
scope and initially directed at protecting the tax bases of developed countries.
With the support of the G20 and working with the UN, IMF, and World Bank, the
OECD has attempted a course correction to take account of some issues
important to revenue mobilization in developing countries, but much more
needs to be done.
Importantly, the UN has adopted a new model treaty article that permits greater
taxation of remote technical services. Associated work is underway to agree on
standards for host country taxation of o fshore sales of assets that derive their
value principally from the host country, such as interests in entities indirectly
owning natural resource assets or telecommunication rights. It is necessary to go
further and to build consensus for implementing more fundamental reforms
that allow host countries to tax remote sellers into their markets (both in digital
and physical goods commerce) and to rationalize income allocation to the
market country. It is beyond the scope of this book to address all of the pressing
tax issues that a fect economic development. It is important that changes to
international taxation rules be adopted in parallel with the recommendations in
this volume regarding investment law.
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In some cases, particularly in countries with extractive industries, tax revenues
from the investor are an important host country beneﬁt from FDI. And yet, it is
common in investor-host country resource concession agreements to include
stabilization clauses that attempt to freeze host country taxation laws or
otherwise to cap or limit ﬁscal take, or economic equilibrium clauses which
attempt to achieve the similar economic results by providing that the host
country compensate the investor if changes to the ﬁscal regime adversely a fect
the investor. Fiscal stabilization limits ﬁscal and tax policy  lexibility available to
host countries. This raises sovereignty concerns in host countries and limits
budgetary options, especially when windfall proﬁts result from unexpectedly
rich ﬁnds or high market prices.
IIAs have been used in various cases to enforce stabilization clauses, or,
e fectively, to act as stabilization clauses, as they have enabled challenges to
changes in the ﬁscal regime as indirect expropriation or violations of FET. For
instance, investors have used IIAs to challenge the imposition of windfall taxes,
capital gains taxes, and other adjustments to tax laws, regulations, and
administration. IIAs should not serve as an alternate forum for investors to
contest host country tax policy, whether or not a bilateral income tax treaty is in
place. This is a role for domestic dispute resolution or bilateral tax treaties,
whose dispute resolution mechanisms ensure that home and host country
governments are involved in the resolution of disputes consistent with the
treaty.
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8.3 SOCIAL DIMENSIONS
As with economic issues more broadly, international investment, including FDI,
o fers a mix of opportunities and challenges for the social aspects of sustainable
development objectives. FDI can be an important channel for improving labor
standards, generating employment, and sustaining livelihoods; but foreign
investors do not always bring such beneﬁts. This chapter identiﬁes tensions
between key social objectives and both FDI and the investment regime. It
provides examples of how tribunals have addressed these tensions.
For example, as states compete for investment, they may be reluctant to take
actions such as increasing labor protection or wages, actions that might raise the
cost of doing business in their countries. Additionally, we know all too well that
when multinational enterprises invest in a host country, their projects, especially
mining and other extractive industry projects, can give rise to major con licts
over use of natural resources. These con licts, which may turn violent and
sometimes lead to murder or criminalization of those opposing the
developments, o ten relate to fears about adverse impacts which the investment
projects may have on the environment, lives, and livelihoods. These fears can be
further intensiﬁed by concerns that, should harm occur, the multinational
enterprise will be able to avoid responsibility by shielding its assets and actors
from the host country's reach.
Con licts also arise from international investment in infrastructure for provision
of water, energy, or other services. While FDI in such projects can produce
important beneﬁts such as improving access to such essential public services,
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common concerns among a fected populations include worries that private
foreign actors have di ferent motives and duties than government entities, and
are not subject to the same accountability mechanisms. These factors, in turn,
may generate suboptimal outcomes from user, ratepayer, and taxpayer
perspectives.
In addition to the ambiguous connections between FDI and social outcomes,
there are also ambiguous connections between IIAs/ISDS and those outcomes.
Some advocates of IIAs and ISDS have argued, for example, that the regime is
important for protecting the human rights of investors from government abuse,
and for preventing improper nationality-based discrimination from infecting
government conduct. However, there are also concerns that both IIAs and ISDS
have marginalized human rights issues.
International investment agreements have tended to be silent on the issue of
human rights (Gordon 2015). A minority of IIAs contain provisions referring to
labor rights (5.5% according to one study). Some of those a ﬁrm states'
commitments to core labor standards or speciﬁc labor rights treaties, and/or
contain provisions seeking to prevent governments from lowering or failing to
enforce their labor law in order to attract or keep the investment. Studies of
equivalent provisions in trade agreements (with investment chapters) have
found them to have very limited e fects (Harrison et al, 2018). An even smaller
share of IIAs (.5%) includes express references to human rights (Gordon 2015).
More recently, some states have tried to impose positive obligations on investors
to respect human rights. For instance, the Morocco-Nigeria bilateral investment
treaty (BIT) declares that investors "shall uphold human rights," and also
requires investors' home states to allow the investors to be sued for actions
causing personal injuries or loss of life in the host state. (arts. 15 & 20). Similarly,
the Brazil-Malawi BIT requires investors to develop “best e forts” to respect
human rights (art. 9). However, it remains unclear whether such obligations will
have any practical e fect.
ISDS can place pressure on governments to prioritize the economic rights and
interests of foreign investors over the social welfare and human rights of other
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stakeholders. Some investment arbitrations, for example, have completely
marginalized human rights issues. For instance, in S.D. Myers v. Canada, the
Canadian government banned the transboundary export of PCB waste to
prevent the possible impairment to human life or health. While the tribunal
acknowledged the health risks associated with the transboundary movement of
hazardous waste, it found that Canada should have used a less trade-restrictive
measure to fulﬁll its health objectives. Similarly, in Chevron v. Ecuador, the
tribunal issued orders seeking to prevent Ecuadorian citizens from enforcing a
judgment they had obtained against Chevron for environmental harms caused
by the company's a ﬁliates, quickly dismissing concerns that the tribunals'
orders negatively impacted the rights of those individuals.
Example: Human Rights, ISDS, and Water
Services Concessions
Investment arbitrations have conﬁrmed the intersection of human rights with
foreign investment. For instance, the right to water has been implicated in eight
investment arbitrations over a 10-year period. Generally, these investment
arbitrations have addressed concession contracts that developing countries have
awarded to private water suppliers. These have resulted in increases to water
tari fs and, at times, reductions in the quality of the supplied water. But
investment arbitral tribunals have mostly reacted to the human rights
implications of water-related investment arbitrations by discounting or ignoring
the state's human rights obligations. For instance, in Biwater v. Tanzania, amici
curiae contended that investor responsibility had to be “assessed in the context
of sustainable development and human rights.” The tribunal noted that the
amici’s observations were “useful” but it did not make any explicit reference to
them in their analysis. Similarly, in SAUR International SA v. Argentina, Argentina
argued that its investment obligations should be read in light of its obligations
with regard to the right to water. However, the Tribunal concluded that a state’s
right to protect human rights is not absolute and must be combined with
respect for the rights and guarantees granted to the foreign investor. It
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purported to balance investor rights against the right to water in its analysis,
although again it made no explicit reference to the right to water in its decision.
In Urbaser v. Argentina, the tribunal did make a concerted e fort, for the ﬁrst time,
to address Argentina’s human rights obligations, noting that the investor’s
claims had to be assessed in the context of the states' authority to regulate. It
also concluded that Argentina’s constitutional obligations to ensure the
population’s health and access to water should prevail over its contractual
obligations. However, the Urbaser case is highly unusual in that the arbitration
also involved a counterclaim by Argentina against the investor, alleging that
they had failed to meet their human rights obligations in operating the
investment. Issues of human rights in the counterclaim may have therefore
driven the comparable analysis in the main arbitration.
Example: Intellectual Property and Public
Health
In recent years, intellectual property rights holders have challenged government
e forts to regulate for public health by deﬁning intellectual property
(trademarks and patents) as protected assets under ISDS provisions (Dreyfuss
and Frankel, 2014). This is a new frontier for rights holders to promote the
expanded protection and enforcement of their intellectual property rights.
Rights holders are now using the investment regime to seek compensation for
what they see as a weakening of their rights. These intellectual property cases
put into stark relief the tensions between protected investments under
investment treaties and national regulation to promote the public good.
Three headline-grabbing cases have highlighted the potential dangers that this
trend may pose to domestic regulation of public health. Intellectual property
rights holders sued Uruguay, Australia, and Canada under BITs and NAFTA
respectively. In two cases, Philip Morris sued sovereign governments, Uruguay
and Australia, over their anti-smoking legislation. In the third, pharmaceutical
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manufacturer Eli Lilly sued the government of Canada under NAFTA's
investment chapter. While in each case, the state prevailed over the foreign
investor, the circumstances and the rulings do not provide a robust deterrent
against intellectual property owners making investment-related claims going
forward.
Philip Morris International, headquartered in Lausanne, sued Uruguay in 2013
under the Switzerland-Uruguay BIT. Uruguay had adopted anti-smoking laws
that included the requirement that 80% of each cigarette pack display graphic
images highlighting the health dangers of smoking. Philip Morris claimed that
the labeling laws reduced the value of its trademarks and investments in
Uruguay. In 2016, the ICSID tribunal ruled in favor of Uruguay, ordering Philip
Morris to pay all of Uruguay's costs of the litigation. Former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg had helped to fund the defense of Uruguay, as that country
would have been hard-pressed to a ford the process. The case was a victory for
Uruguay's regulatory discretion. However, the unpredictability of the arbitral
process and the disadvantages of resource-poor targets facing costly litigation in
ISDS cases suggest that trademark interests will not be deterred by this one
case.
Philip Morris Asia sued Australia in 2011 over its plain-packaging laws that
banned the use of Philip Morris trademarks on cigarette packages. Philip Morris
claimed that Australia had breached the 1993 Australia-Hong Kong investment
agreement. The tribunal declined jurisdiction to hear the case because Philip
Morris Asia had acquired its shares in Australia in 2011 only a ter it knew of
Australia's plans to implement plain packaging policies. Australia won the case
in 2015 on narrow procedural grounds and the case did not substantively address
a government's right to regulate in the public interest. The narrowness of the
decision is unlikely to serve as a deterrent to intellectual property rights holders
aggressively pursuing stronger protection and enforcement through ISDS.
In March 2017, an ICSID tribunal ruled in favor of Canada in Eli Lilly's patent case
under NAFTA's investment chapter. This was the ﬁrst award addressing patents
and international investment law. In 2010 and 2011, the Federal Court of Canada
revoked Eli Lilly's patents on Zyprexa and Strattera on the basis that they failed
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to meet Canada's standard of utility under its "promise utility doctrine." The
Federal Appellate Court and Canada's Supreme Court a ﬁrmed the revocation.
Eli Lilly ﬁled a complaint with ICSID seeking damages; the idea that a private
investor could challenge the decisions of the highest court in a sovereign country
struck many observers as beyond the pale.
Canada is committed to containing health care costs and has a robust generic
industry. Its "promise utility doctrine" is designed to ensure that pharmaceutical
ﬁrms cannot obtain patents unless they can demonstrate that the patented
product will fulﬁll the promise that it claims to fulﬁll. This doctrine helps reduce
the issuance of frivolous patents that prevent generic entry, reduce competition,
and keep drug prices high. Generic ﬁrms are the main beneﬁciaries of the
promise doctrine. While Eli Lilly argued that Canada had dramatically changed
its standards, the ICSID tribunal found that Canada's policy had evolved
gradually and incrementally and thus had not violated Eli Lilly's rights. Even
though Eli Lilly ultimately lost, the case established a new avenue for intellectual
property rights holders to litigate patents. In this sense, it is a landmark case
exemplifying the expansion of subject matter covered under international
investment agreements. The narrowness of the ruling will not deter patent
holders from continuing to litigate along the investment agreement route.
Going forward, a rise should be expected in the numbers of intellectual
property-based cases challenging state regulations for public health.
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8.4 ENVIRONMENTAL
DIMENSIONS
FDI can provide important contributions to addressing environmental problems.
For instance, according to the "pollution halo" theory, when a company with
modern practices purchases operations abroad, it may bring those cleaner
practices with it, helping to reduce the environmental footprint of the company
acquired. However, FDI can also be associated with negative environmental
impacts. It may lead to excessive exploitation of natural resources in countries
where property rights over these are poorly deﬁned or enforced. These concerns
are particularly relevant to forests and ﬁsheries.
A further concern is that countries may seek to attract investment by lowering
environmental standards (race-to-the-bottom) or failing to raise them
su ﬁciently (regulatory chill).
Environmental Provisions in IIAs
Recognizing these issues, some IIAs contain provisions that seek to prevent
governments from lowering or failing to enforce environmental standards in
order to attract investment. The United States' model bilateral investment
treaty, for example, states that Parties to the treaty shall not "waive or otherwise
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derogate from" environmental laws in order to encourage investment. But the
treaties typically lack strong and e fective enforcement mechanisms to ensure
adherence to these provisions.
More problematically, as is discussed below, international investment treaties
generally allow companies to challenge government e forts to strengthen
environmental laws or policies, and even to enforce existing ones. A limited
number of investment treaties contain "environmental exceptions" that purport
to protect environmental measures that meet a series of legal standards. The
e fectiveness of these provisions is unclear. Similar provisions in trade treaties
have been heavily criticised for their failure to protect legitimate environmental
and health measures. The few ISDS cases that have examined these types of
exceptions illustrate that they fail to provide cover for even good faith measures
adopted in the public interest to address concerns about environmental
impacts.
The Right to Regulatory Stability and the
Environment
The right to regulatory stability has already been successfully invoked to
challenge environmental regulations and could be a signiﬁcant impediment to
necessary policy responses to climate change. One of the ﬁrst successful
investment treaty claims based on the right to regulatory stability was the award
under NAFTA's Chapter 11 (Investment) in Metalclad v. Mexico. The case involved a
United States corporation that was attempting to construct and operate a
hazardous waste site in the Mexican state of San Luis Potosi. The state and
municipal governments blocked the project on environmental grounds. In
response, the investor brought a claim under NAFTA's investment chapter and
received a multi-million dollar award of damages, based, inter alia, on the
tribunal's conclusion that NAFTA's FET provision guaranteed the investor a right
to a "predictable framework for ... business planning and investment."
The Global Investment Regime and Sustainable Development
68
Cases that the Swedish energy ﬁrm Vattenfall AB brought against Germany
highlight the tensions between energy investments and the public interest in
the environment. The Swedish energy ﬁrm Vattenfall AB sued Germany in 2009
under the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) to force Germany to relax environmental
standards for a coal-ﬁred power plant. Vattenfall AB argued that Germany had
violated its obligation for fair and equitable treatment by adopting more
stringent environmental policies a ter it had provisionally approved the project.
In another pending claim under the ECT, Vattenfall is challenging Germany's
decision to phase out nuclear energy. This claim was ﬁled in 2012 a ter Germany
abruptly decided to accelerate the phasing out of nuclear energy in response to
the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan. The German government
o fered substantial compensation to all a fected nuclear power generators,
including Vattenfall. The company does not dispute that the German policy was
geared to protect public health and the environment. It made use of its
international treaty protection to sue for 4.7 billion Euros compensation for
losses allegedly su fered, arguing that the German policy violated the doctrine
of legitimate expectations under the fair and equitable treatment standard.
The right to regulatory stability could similarly be used to challenge e forts by
governments to mitigate climate change. In order to meet the Paris Agreement's
goal of keeping the average increase in global temperatures below 2 degrees
Celsius, governments will need to implement aggressive new policies designed
to shi t investment away from fossil fuels and toward renewable energy. These
policies will adversely a fect existing investments in fossil fuels in a manner that
could be held to violate investors' right to regulatory stability.
Subsidizing environmentally harmful
investments
An additional consideration is whether IIAs operate as a subsidy for
environmentally harmful projects. In the section discussing economic
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implications of IIAs, this book considered how IIAs seek to reduce risks for
foreign investors in order to encourage FDI (and coveted beneﬁts). This book
also discussed how IIAs appear to be ambiguous in actually in luencing FDI
 lows. But if IIAs were successful, the implication is that the treaties serve to
enable investments that otherwise might not have happened, even if those
investments result in net environmental harms. This issue is particularly
pressing in the context of fossil fuel investments. If an extractives project for the
development of new coal or oil resources would not have happened without an
investment treaty and the protections it o fers, this suggests that investment
treaties are exacerbating the climate change challenge, further threatening the
2 degree Celsius target and the objective of policy coherence re lected in the
SDGs.
This highlights that IIAs can potentially be used to support climate and other
environmentally friendly investments, but, at present, are equally geared to
support projects that undermine environmental goals.
The Global Investment Regime and Sustainable Development
70
8.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has explored how the economic, social, and environmental
dimensions of sustainable development inter-relate to both FDI and IIAs. It has
found that FDI can potentially have both positive and negative impacts on all
three dimensions of sustainable development. But it has argued that: (1) IIAs
pose a number of challenges to governments seeking to harness FDI to support
sustainable development objectives; (2) various provisions in IIAs which seek to
explicitly protect and promote social and environmental goals are not e fective
in that endeavor; and (3) signiﬁcant decisions by international investment
tribunals do not appropriately balance investor rights with broader sustainable
development objectives.
Collectively, the extent of these problems suggests that the investment law
regime is not su ﬁciently attuned to the challenges of sustainable development.
In light of this, the next chapter will argue that there is a need to re-orient the
regime towards addressing broader economic, environmental and social
objectives.
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9. RE-THINKING
THE
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
REGIME AS
GOVERNANCE
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapters of this book have identiﬁed deﬁciencies in the
international investment regime and its impacts on a variety of public policy
goals. Thus far the book has focused on the undesirable e fects of the regime, not
on the institutional causes underlying its dysfunction. This chapter calls for a
reconceptualization of the international investment law regime as a complex
multi-party form of governance that should be contributing to broader
economic, social and environmental goals. The chapter proposes a number of
procedural principles and substantive priorities for developing a reimagined
international investment regime.
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9.2 WHY DO WE NEED
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE?
International Investment Law as a Complex
Multi-party Form of Governance
Instead of thinking about IIAs primarily as international treaties for protecting
private property rights and expectations, they should be viewed as one part of a
complex multi-party, multi-level form of global economic governance for
managing the role of transnational capital in development. As a governance
system, the IIAs structure the relationships between many di ferent parties,
such as home states, host states, transnational investors, domestic capital, and
the full range of domestic host state constituencies (such as workers, consumers,
other businesses, and citizens).
Understanding international investment treaties as a form of governance does
not necessarily resolve the vexing questions facing international investment law
today. However, it does help foreground questions which, while not new, have
generally been in the background in international investment governance.
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Chief among these questions is the fundamental governance question: who
governs? In other words, who is making the decisions on the substantive and
procedural rules of IIAs, decisions that involve the exercise of public authority
and that impact critical public policies and the well-being of millions?
And, for whose beneﬁt? Are key constituencies consulted appropriately during
the negotiation, ratiﬁcation, interpretation, and adjudication of international
investment rules? If we are relying on states to ensure that stakeholder interests
are properly taken into account, are states, in fact, capable of e fectively ensuring
such participation, given the collective action problems endemic to the global
economic space?
Finally, are there any rules that govern the governing? What international rules,
norms, and principles apply to the exercise of public authority in the making and
enforcing of investment rules?
At the same time, it is necessary to think about the appropriate levels and forms
of international investment governance which is currently governed at multiple
levels and in multiple forms, including:
> in the contracts signed between governments and investors;
> in national and subnational law created within individual nation states;
> in bilateral, regional, plurilateral and multilateral agreements between
countries primarily addressing investment, including IIAs.
The following diagram provides an illustration of how the international
investment law regime operates both in national and international spheres.
Re-thinking the International Investment Regime as Governance
75
DIAGRAM Governance of International Investment Regime
The Challenge and Opportunities of
Governing International Investment
One way to analytically simplify the key challenges that the international
investment regime poses is through Dani Rodrik's conception of the "political
trilemma" (Rodrik: 2007). According to Rodrik, this trilemma re lects the fact
that it is not possible to simultaneously have deep economic integration,
national autonomy ("sovereignty" in his version), and democratic politics. If
parties want more economic globalization they must give up either some
democracy or some autonomy (sovereignty).
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DIAGRAM Political Trilemma
This diagram depicts three choices. If one seeks to engage in deep economic
integration and preserve democratic politics, the choice would be "global
federation." The European Union exempliﬁes this conﬁguration; states
surrendered monetary autonomy to integrate more deeply as a regional
economic bloc.
The problem that states are having with a range of contemporary international
economic policies, including the international investment regime, and also the
globalization of intellectual property, is depicted in the segment connecting
deep economic integration and the nation-state. Rodrik deﬁnes this
conﬁguration as "the golden straitjacket." Most of the countries that are
experiencing harms from the international investment regime have engaged in
a neoliberal economic version of deep economic integration (e.g. the
Washington Consensus) and the golden straitjacket restricts their policy
autonomy. The needs and demands of mobile capital and foreign investors
sharply constrain the ability of a host country to regulate policy in response to its
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constituents. Foreign intellectual property owners have challenged states
seeking to respond to health crises such as HIV/AIDS; foreign direct investors
have challenged host states seeking to reduce pollution, such as lead poisoning,
or move out of fossil fuels and into clean energy.
Many of the calls for reform – across investment, intellectual property, and tax
policy – directly address the balance between domestic regulatory policy
autonomy and deep economic integration. Scaling back foreign investors' rights
would loosen the strictures of the golden straitjacket, increase domestic policy
autonomy, and might allow host states to increase democratic accountability to
their citizens.
However, relying only on domestic political autonomy will not address all of the
problems caused by capital mobility. Traditionally, international economic
governance has been justiﬁed through its role in helping national governments
to make the most of the opportunities provided by internationally mobile
capital. For example, by providing international legal recourse, it can help
governments keep the promises that they make in order to attract investors. By
providing this commitment device, international economic governance can
decrease the risk premiums which hosts may otherwise have to pay to attract
investment. The existing governance regime has focused almost exclusively on
this role. There are, however, several challenges for countries managing
international investment that international economic governance also might
address.
In the modern global economy, investors are able to make choices about where
to invest, and how to structure or restructure their investments within and across
borders. This provides a number of other rationales for international regulation.
Firstly, there is a danger that states will engage in a "race to the bottom" as they
compete with other nations to attract investment by, for instance, o fering tax
breaks, providing ﬁnancial incentives, or weakening their social or
environmental regulations. As states ﬁght over who gets the investment, they
may all forsake government revenues and/or decrease regulation of key social
and environmental issues. Secondly, corporations with su ﬁcient power and
resources can use their ability to structure their operations across borders to
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minimize their exposure to liability and damages and increase their ability to
take advantage of favorable laws and incentives. Investors can also exploit a
combination of domestic laws and investment treaties, and those instruments'
respective dispute resolution processes, to maximize their opportunities for
winning compensation from host state governments (or successfully pressing
the government to shi t policies in their favor). These challenges are very
di ﬁcult for countries to address alone. Countries could beneﬁt from
international cooperation aimed at overcoming collective action problems and
reducing the complexities of legal rules governing a group of corporate a ﬁliates.
International cooperation could be useful on issues such as climate change or
the protection of ﬁsh stocks, as individual governments may prioritize speciﬁc
e forts to attract or keep foreign investment notwithstanding consequent harms
to global commons.
States concerned with the direction of the system, the well-being of their
citizens, and the sustainability of this model of investment protection, can ﬁnd
themselves in a number of collective action dilemmas when they seek to govern
investment and economic  lows of all kinds, in the service of di ferent values and
allocations of rights. The hypermobility of capital means states that seek
alternative regulatory models may fear capital  light, with resulting negative
impacts on their development resources and plans. Moreover, leaving it up to
individual states to decide how they wish to attract foreign investment and treat
foreign investors may be detrimental for all states and citizens across the globe.
Some forms of international cooperation, therefore, seem desirable. At the same
time, e fective international action is di ﬁcult to achieve and may constrain
individual states from taking actions they might otherwise wish to take.
All of this means that e fectively managing transnational capital for the good of
all a fected stakeholders – and in the process addressing the role of investment
law in the current governance crisis – cannot be achieved solely from an
investors' rights perspective. Principles are required to orient the goals of the
regime and decide at what levels regulation should happen. It is all the more
important to ask these questions when the investment regime is viewed against
a background of profound imbalances in geopolitical and economic power.
These imbalances were at the root of the ﬁrst international investment treaties
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signed in the 1950s. They continue to in luence e forts to reform investment law
today, and must, therefore, be taken into account in any e fort to formulate a
progressive vision.
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9.3 PROCEDURAL PRINCIPLES
AND SUBSTANTIVE PRIORITIES
FOR A NEW SYSTEM
Recognizing international investment law as a form of governance does not by
itself settle any of the vexing questions facing domestic and international
policymakers around investment. However, it does help in identifying and
formulating ways of answering those questions. This section ﬁrst identiﬁes a set
of procedural principles that will help to steer international investment law
towards an appropriate balancing of competing interests. It then moves on to set
out a series of substantive priorities that can orient the international investment
regime towards the broader social/sustainable development objectives outlined
in previous chapters.
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DIAGRAM Principles and Substantive Priorities
Procedural Principles
The current investment law regime reveals a remarkable absence of guiding
procedural principles governing the behavior of the actors and the operation of
the instruments that animate the system when the importance and e fects of
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transnational capital are considered. There are ﬁve core principles that should
apply to all aspects of the system.
1. Transparency
Transparency is a fundamental norm of good governance and the rule of law.
Given that the investment law regime involves many issues of public interest
(rather than private interests between contracting parties), there is a need to
enshrine transparency as a fundamental principle of the system. The
presumption should be that in the formulation, implementation and
enforcement of investment law, stakeholders should be able to ﬁnd out about
critical elements of the process, access key documentation, and witness
important proceedings. For instance, dra ts of investment treaties, national laws
on investment, and proceedings of national courts and investment tribunals
should be made publicly available.
2. Participation
Participation, understood as some form of voice for the governed, is a norm of
good governance that can be found across a wide range of political and legal
systems, including (but not limited to) Western democracies. In the investment
context, it is not su ﬁcient that stakeholders merely have access to information.
They also need to be able to actively participate in and engage with the process
by which investment law and policy is formulated, implemented, and enforced
at both national and international levels.
Di ferent kinds and levels of participation will be appropriate at di ferent stages
in the investment regulation process. A participation principle implies, for
instance, that at the national level, governments should have consultation
processes that allow meaningful contributions from citizens over the
formulation of policies regarding international investment protection,
liberalization, and contracts with investors that have signiﬁcant implications for
public services. At the international level, given the lack of democracy in many
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states, non-state parties, including community representatives, should be able
to participate in processes such as regional and international treaty-making
processes and disputes between states and corporations.
3. Reciprocity
In the context of international investment governance, the principle of
reciprocity means that when key actors are given valuable legal rights within an
investment regime, good governance entails that they also bear appropriate
legal duties and obligations.
The key beneﬁciaries of the current investment regime are corporations. Their
rights are protected by national laws and international investment treaties.
While investors also have responsibilities as set out in investment contracts and
national legislation (e.g. on workers' rights, environmental laws), the power
imbalances between investors and many states and the mobility of capital
means that the responsibilities of investors are not always commensurate with
the beneﬁts they receive, nor are they as readily subject to judicial oversight as
the rights of investors.
Good economic governance means ensuring that legally privileged actors such
as, in the investment context, foreign investors, have responsibilities that are
commensurate with the beneﬁts they receive through the investment law
regime, and that the interests of all key stakeholders and a fected parties, not
just investors, are represented or accounted for in an appropriate manner. For
instance, international investment governance could be used to meaningfully
reinforce key international legal principles from other areas of international law
(such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights).
Re-thinking the International Investment Regime as Governance
84
4. Accountability
Accountability is a fundamental norm of governance today. Without
accountability, exercises of public authority, and private economic power under
the aegis of public law, lose legitimacy.
Currently, the investment law regime only holds states accountable and not
investors. This is inconsistent with the principle of accountability understood as
a norm of good governance. Instead, there should be mechanisms for ensuring
that corporations that fail to abide by their obligations are also held accountable
for their conduct. This principle should apply to both narrower contractual
obligations and broader legal obligations at both national and international
levels, so that both states and a fected communities have means of redress for
signiﬁcant harms done to them.
A more traditional form of accountability would be to reform the investment
dispute system to incorporate some form of judicial or appellate review of
arbitral tribunal decisions.
Another kind of accountability may be appropriate when a new investment
contract or treaty is being negotiated. Imposing obligations of due diligence on
the state and disclosure on the investor, could, if coupled with the transparency
principle, ensure that a fected constituencies and civil society receive the
relevant information that would enable them to e fectively participate in the
obligation-formulation stage. This kind of accountability can also help
downstream, should it become necessary to identify and enforce failures on the
part of the investor to honor its commitments to abide by national and
international law.
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5. Subsidiarity
Subsidiarity is a principle that argues that issues should be decided only by a
higher authority when the objectives of an action cannot be e fectively achieved
by a lower authority. The underlying rationale is that individual human beings
should be no more separated from decisions that a fect them than is necessary
to protect their interests. The principle of subsidiarity in this context suggests
that it is only when objectives cannot be met at the national level that it should
be recourse to the international level to try to ﬁnd solutions.
One of the key challenges for re-imagining international investment law is to
decide what role the existing governance levels and forms should play in
harnessing opportunities and addressing challenges. An international
investment regime will necessarily include components at each level. Not all
solutions are located at one level alone, nor is a "one size ﬁts all" solution
imminent. International e forts can and should support genuine democratic
governance at the national level, while at the same time making a contribution
to addressing important global problems that countries struggle to address by
themselves.
The mobility of foreign investors causes some problems for individual states
trying to make e fective decisions about foreign investment. Thus there may be
some situations where international rules governing investment are necessary
to protect the ability of states to regulate and, for example, avoid "races to the
bottom" and tackle global commons issues such as climate change. Even where
there is a genuine rationale for raising issues to the international level, there
should be a clear understanding of the likely costs of such a process (for
example, in terms of possible democratic deﬁcits) and the likely gains.
A systematic application of the principles of transparency, participation,
reciprocity, accountability, and subsidiarity would contribute to shaping an
enhanced international investment governance system.
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Substantive Priorities
Recognizing international investment law as governance does not mean that the
traditional functions of international investment law (in particular, protection of
investment from direct expropriation, and preventing "gunboat diplomacy" by
which powerful home states use force or threats thereof to protect their foreign
investors) are irrelevant. They continue to be an important part of the system.
But a governance perspective raises a number of important questions and
concerns which, while not new, o ten remain in the background in the prevailing
paradigm of investment law as a contract-like system for protecting private
property abroad. Moreover, the evolution of investment law, the nature of
international business, and the convergence around core sustainable
development objectives that have occurred since 1959, have led to the
identiﬁcation of a number of shortcomings and deﬁciencies in this system when
considered from the perspective of current governance norms, needs, and
expectations. The traditional values of the investment law system must,
therefore, be harnessed to achieve other values and goals that form part of the
governance landscape, and where investment law has clear impacts. An
investment regime should, at a minimum be consistent with core and urgent
global priorities as re lected in the Sustainable Development Goals, including:
Poverty reduction (and, conversely, increase in prosperity), especially
for those at the bottom. Despite signiﬁcant progress in reducing global
poverty, over one billion people still live on less than $1.25 per day
(source: World Bank), making development-oriented investment a top
priority.
Reduction of economic inequality within states (intra-national or
domestic inequality), between states (international inequality) and
among all people compared transnationally (global inequality).
Although the empirical picture is muddled, the bulk of the research
suggests that the way investment (and trade) is structured has a direct
impact on inequality trends within and between states, and globally.
(Source: Bourguignon; IMF Report; ).
1
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Human dignity. The way transnational capital is deployed and under
what terms, its impact on host state constituencies such as workers,
consumers, and other businesses, and the interaction of investment
law with host state e forts to undertake social welfare legislation and
regulatory reform, all directly a fect the socioeconomic conditions for
human dignity and the e fective human rights that host state citizens
can enjoy.
Protection of the environment and planet. Recent trends in the
interpretation and application of investment law with respect to host
state environmental regulations, and the perennial challenges of
resource extraction in ways that minimize environmental and social
costs, have together highlighted the importance of an investment law
that fully embraces sustainable development goals and safeguards.
Moreover, if we calibrate investment law carefully with respect to its consistency
with other norms, we can expect synergies. Reductions in inequality will mean
increased protection of the environment, leading to higher standards of living,
which can support higher returns on investment. Such calibration was not
possible in 1959 when the ﬁrst Bilateral Investment Treaty was created, because
our scientiﬁc understanding of sustainable development was minimal at the
time, and because many of these other norms simply did not exist then.
Consistency, in this case, means more than mere compatibility – it means an
investment regime designed to work coherently within a regulatory framework,
domestic and international – of laws aimed at ensuring safety and survival for
the most economically vulnerable sectors of society, laws promoting their
development and the development of all sectors of society, laws protecting the
environment, and laws eliminating all forms of discrimination and the
enhancement of human dignity.
3
4
Re-thinking the International Investment Regime as Governance
88
9.4 CONCLUSION
When understood as a framework for governance, the international investment
regime as it stands today has noteworthy deﬁciencies. This is the result of
governance norms and tasks at the global level being poorly understood and
relatively underdeveloped during the early period of the regime in the latter half
of the 20th century. Governance in the investment space is necessarily a
collective and disaggregated exercise. States, investors, arbitrators, international
organizations, and civil society all have vital governance roles to play in
formulating, applying, interpreting, and enforcing investment law norms.
Application of the procedural principles and substantive priorities
recommended in this chapter can stimulate the development of an investment
regime ﬁt for the 21st century.
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10. REBALANCING
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
LAW:
SUBSTANTIVE
REFORMS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
If the investment regime is to be reconﬁgured towards key 21st-century goals,
values, and priorities, this book advocates a multi-pronged strategy of
reconceptualization and reform. This chapter o fers a number of
recommendations for substantive and procedural reforms through which the
principles laid out in this book for 21st-century international investment
governance could be institutionalized.
The ﬁrst step in this reform is the internalization of the fundamental paradigm
shi t advocated here. This book recommends a fundamental re-
conceptualization of international investment law, not simply a menu of
speciﬁc or ad hoc reform proposals.
Next is a process of rebalancing investor rights and duties, restoring the original
scope of investor protection as envisioned during the emergence of the regime
in the 1950s. This rebalancing also involves incorporating substantive investor
duties, thus orienting investor incentives more closely with those of the global
system within which investment operates.
In the next chapter, a second target for rebalancing is to revisit the ISDS system.
Finally, in the following chapter, the book advocates a realignment of the
current IIA system towards greater coherence with, if not support for, 21st-
century global priorities. This realignment should include negotiation of a new
multilateral framework agreement, as set out in Chapter 8.
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10.2 REBALANCING:
PROTECTING THE SCOPE OF
LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT
POLICY-MAKING
Currently, the expansive reading of investor rights, particularly through arbitral
interpretations of the FET standard, has the e fect of restricting sovereign rights
to regulatory action and legislative enactments to achieve social, economic, and
environmental goals, with adverse e fects on foreign investors. Rebalancing
investor rights means returning international investment law norms to their
original intent as expressed in the early formative stages of the IIA system.
Investor rights originally consisted of the right to compensation upon wrongful
expropriation, together with the treatment consistent with customary
international law rules on the treatment of aliens.
This aspect of rebalancing is required in order that IIAs do not continue to
subvert states' regulatory e forts with respect to urgent 21st-century global
priorities such as public health and the protection of the environment.
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DIAGRAM Rebalancing the scales
The ﬁrst set of reforms, therefore, focuses on reducing the costs of IIAs for host
countries while increasing the beneﬁts. This can be done by implementing the
following 4 reforms (A-D):
A. Clarify and Restrict the Kinds of Investment
and Nationality of Investors Covered by
Agreements
1. Clearly deﬁne the kinds of investment covered by the IIA. While host
countries signed IIAs to attract FDI, treaties have been interpreted as covering a
broader range of 'investments,' including those providing more limited or no
beneﬁts to the host country, and in which investors assume little to no risk. For
instance, the extent to which anticipated proﬁts in a particular country should
be protected from various kinds of government action (particularly where an
actual investment in the country is minimal or non-existent) is an open
question, as is the contentious issue of whether intellectual property should be
protected under current investment treaties.
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These underlying questions are likely to grow in importance with the expansion
of business that blurs the line between investment and trade. What, if any, of the
new forms of cross-border business should be covered under investment treaties
or other investment agreements, and what should be covered by the very
di ferent agreements on trade in services?
Example: Deﬁning Investment Clearly 
The India Model BIT (2015) narrows the traditionally broad deﬁnition of a
protected investment by stating that it covers "enterprises" such as
subsidiaries established in the host country by a foreign parent company.
This contrasts with the approach more commonly followed in investment
treaties, which is to protect "all assets" of a foreign investor irrespective of
whether the foreign investor had established an actual a ﬁliate in the host
country. The India Model BIT further narrows the scope of covered
investments by identifying certain characteristics that covered
investments should possess, such as signiﬁcance for the host state's
development. The Model BIT also explicitly excludes certain assets from
the deﬁnition of an investment, including “(i) portfolio investments of the
enterprise or in another enterprise; (ii) debt securities issued by a
government or government-owned or controlled enterprise, or loans to a
government or government-owned or controlled enterprise; (iii) any pre-
operational expenditure relating to admission, establishment, acquisition
or expansion of the enterprise incurred before the commencement of
substantial business operations of the enterprise in the territory of the
Party where the investment is made; (iv) claims to money that arise solely
from commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or
enterprise in the territory of a Party to an enterprise in the territory of
another Party; (v) goodwill, brand value, market share or similar
intangible rights; (vi) claims to money that arise solely from the extension
of credit in connection with any commercial transaction; (vii) an order or
judgment sought or entered in any judicial, administrative or arbitral
proceeding; (viii) any other claims to money that do not involve the kind of
interests or operations set out in the deﬁnition of investment in this
Treaty.”
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2. Tighten the deﬁnitions of nationality of investors to reduce their ability to
take advantage of the most investor-friendly treaties that a host country has
negotiated. Under many current treaties, the deﬁnition of an investor eligible
for protection is so broad that an investor from another country can gain the
beneﬁts of a treaty by simply incorporating an entity in the treaty country,
without any substantive business activity or management control in the country.
The result is that investors can shop for treaties that are most investor-friendly.
Various proposals exist for closing this loophole, from basing coverage on the
location of the ﬁrm's headquarters to the less stringent requirement of granting
coverage to ﬁrms with substantial business activity in the treaty country.
Example: Establishing an American company as a Dutch Entity 
By establishing a subsidiary in the Netherlands, US-based ExxonMobil
gained protection from a Dutch treaty despite ExxonMobil being
headquartered in the U.S.
B. Narrow Interpretation of Key IIA Doctrines
1. Redra t national treatment provisions to speciﬁcally ensure that the focus of
such provisions is on preventing nationality-based discrimination, for instance
by including wording o fering protection to investors from discrimination on
the basis of nationality. IIAs o ten contain provisions relating to national
treatment. Essentially, these provisions ensure that foreign investors are not
treated less favorably than domestic investors in like circumstances. The
rationale is to protect the foreign investor from discrimination on the basis of
being a national of a di ferent state. However, at times, the national treatment
provision has been used as a gateway to protect foreign investors from any type
of discriminatory treatment – in which they are not treated the same as
domestic investors – even if the basis for that treatment is not discrimination
based on the foreign investor's nationality. This form of protection is beyond the
rationale of IIAs.
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Example: National Treatment – Discrimination versus Discrimination
Based on Nationality 
In Bilcon v. Canada (2015), the tribunal concluded that Canada had
breached its national treatment obligations towards the American
investor by treating the foreign investor's environmental assessment
process less favorably than the treatment a forded to domestic investors.
The tribunal found that the foreign investor did not have to prove that the
state's departure from national treatment had to be explicitly shown to be
a result of the investor’s nationality.
2. Remove the fair and equitable treatment obligation. The right to FET has
emerged as both the provision most frequently invoked by investors and the
most common basis for successful claims. FET provisions have been interpreted
by investment tribunals to include a right to a "stable and predictable regulatory
environment" that does not "frustrate their legitimate expectations." Given the
vague nature of the words "fair" and "equitable," and the varying interpretations
given to the FET concept by tribunals, it is exceedingly di ﬁcult for governments
and others to know what the standard requires or when it has been breached.
This uncertainty, in turn, can have negative impacts including over-deterring
legitimate regulatory conduct (Bonnitcha 2014), and generating unnecessary
and undesirable litigation.
Example: FET and Changes in World Mineral Prices 
FET obligations have restrained governments from responding to
signiﬁcant changes in circumstances. For example, governments have not
been able to defend tax or royalty increases in response to sharp and
unexpected increases in mineral prices, even though the increases would
leave the investor with adequate rates of return, o ten more than
anticipated under the original lower price environment. In 2008, several
petroleum ﬁrms brought claims against Ecuador a ter the country
introduced new taxes on windfall proﬁts and other measures to capture a
larger share of the increased proﬁts investors were receiving from higher
oil prices. In 2014, a tribunal found that Ecuador's practice constituted a
breach of its investment treaty obligations (Perenco v. Ecuador).
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3. Limit investor protection to denials of justice. Foreign investors should only
be protected against gross miscarriages of justice by domestic courts. Generally,
claims for denial of justice are concerned with denial, unreasonable delay, or
obstruction of access to courts; gross deﬁciency in judicial or administration
processes; and failure to provide due process rights, among others. Such a
provision prevents investors from su fering mistreatment by the host country's
legal system and provides recourse if such mistreatment occurs. Denial of justice
provisions generally require foreign investors to exhaust local remedies before
claiming breach of this provision, as discussed in the following chapter.
Example: FET and Denial of Justice 
The Colombia-India BIT (2009) deﬁnes fair and equitable treatment as
"the prohibition against denial of justice in criminal, civil, or
administrative proceedings in accordance with the principle of due
process." A similar deﬁnition is found in the China-Peru FTA (2009) and
the Colombia-United Kingdom BIT (2010). The Indian Model BIT (2015)
includes protection against denial of justice, as it is deﬁned under
customary international law, without reference to fair and equitable
treatment.
4. Remove indirect expropriation from the deﬁnition of compensable
expropriations in IIAs. A common provision found in IIA is protection for foreign
investors against indirect expropriation. This protects investors against
governmental measures that adversely a fect the value of an investment but do
not actually transfer its ownership or control to the government. The notion of
indirect expropriation is thought to be re lected in customary international law,
although state practice indicates a very di ferent understanding of indirect
expropriation than is assumed under international investment law. Given the
lack of consistent state practice in awarding compensation for forms of indirect
expropriation, it is di ﬁcult to argue that protections against indirect
expropriation amount to customary international law. Moreover, in instances of
indirect expropriation due to state regulatory measures, "the reduction of the
value of private property is not necessarily accompanied by an increase in public
wealth" (Nouvel, 2002). Therefore the rationale for compensation is not as
strong.
Rebalancing International Investment Law: Substantive Reforms
97
Example: Excluding Regulatory Action from Deﬁnition of
Expropriation 
Article 7 of the Brazilian Model BIT (2015) prohibits the direct
nationalization or expropriation of investments, except when done for a
public purpose, in a non-discriminatory manner, with e fective
compensation, and in accordance with due process of law, but Article 7(5)
clariﬁes that the "article only provides for direct expropriation, where an
investment is nationalized or otherwise directly expropriated through
formal transfer of title or ownership rights," thereby excluding indirect
expropriations.
5. Prevent IIAs from being used to accord rights to investors who have not yet
entered the market. Some home countries of investors have sought to use IIAs
to guarantee access to host countries that are party to proposed IIAs. Extending
IIA protection pre-establishment would move IIAs beyond protecting existing
investors to ensuring rights to ﬁrms that have not entered the market. As a
practical matter, it is hard to imagine what kind of damages a potential investor
might claim for its being denied entry to a market when an IIA guarantees it. Any
award would be highly speculative, presumably based on proﬁts the investor
would have made if it had been allowed into the market. E forts to directly
change government policy by, for example, requiring the government to
abandon procedures that close sectors to foreign investors, or to review the
proposals of individual investors, should not be covered in IIAs but rather by
direct intergovernmental discussions or agreements.
Example: Prohibiting Pre-Establishment Rights 
The Indian Model BIT (2015) limits pre-establishment protections for
foreign investors. Article 1.4(iii) of the Model BIT speciﬁes that "pre-
operational expenditure[s] relating to admission, establishment,
acquisition or expansion of the enterprise" do not constitute covered
investments.
6. Exclude the MFN clause from investment treaties or clarify its scope. Many
investment treaties contain a "most-favored-nation" (MFN) provision requiring
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that a foreign investor receives treatment that is no less favorable than that
given to an investor from any third country. In many instances, foreign investors
have been able to rely on this provision in order to "import" more favorable
provisions in other IIAs, including more favorable substantive protections and
more favorable dispute resolution clauses. This has the e fect of expanding the
obligations of the host state to areas for which it did not originally o fer its
protection.
In reforming IIAs, it may be pertinent to remove these clauses from IIAs, such as
India has done in its model IIA, or clarify their meaning to avoid unintended
expansion of their scope.
Example: Narrowing the scope of the MFN provision 
Article 8.7(4) of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
between Canada and the European Union and its Member States, states:
"For greater certainty, the 'treatment' referred to [the MFN provision]
does not include procedures for the resolution of investment disputes
between investors and states provided for in other international
investment treaties and other trade agreements. Substantive obligations
in other international investment treaties and other trade agreements do
not in themselves constitute 'treatment', and thus cannot give rise to a
breach of this Article, absent measures adopted or maintained by a Party
pursuant to those obligations."
C. Ensure that IIAs Do Not Limit the Scope of
Legitimate Policy-Making by Governments
1. Remove restrictions on exchange controls. A signiﬁcant number of
investment treaties include language that prevents investors from being subject
to measures that limit or otherwise govern their access to foreign exchange for
dividends, remission of capital, debt service, or for the purchase of imports.
While there are questions about the advantages and disadvantages of foreign
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exchange controls for economic growth agendas, administrative e ﬁciency, and
other policy considerations, it is increasingly recognized that there can be
important justiﬁcations for ensuring that governments have the ability to
adequately regulate capital  lows in or out. The issue of exchange controls is
better le t out of IIAs and instead addressed by an institution such as the
International Monetary Fund where it can be viewed within the bigger picture of
reducing or addressing volatile capital  lows. Alternatively, and at a minimum,
controls should allow governments to temporarily impose restrictions on access
to foreign exchange by covered investors when the host country is faced with a
potential or actual crisis. This is consistent with the growing international
consensus that foreign exchange controls do, sometimes, have a role to play in
stabilizing economies.
Example: The IMF and Capital Liberalization 
In the 1990s, the IMF pushed for capital account liberalization as a tool to
promote economic growth. This policy approach was re lected and
advanced in many investment treaties concluded during that decade, as
IIAs o ten contained broad commitments by governments to allow
investors to freely move money in and out of their countries without
restriction. However, lessons learned from a series of ﬁnancial crises that
rocked regions and the world in the decades before and a ter the
millennium (such as the Asian ﬁnancial crisis of 1997-98, and the global
ﬁnancial crises of 2008) provided lessons that governments may beneﬁt
from adopting capital controls to discourage occurrence of such crises and,
when such crises do occur, to minimize their e fects (Gallagher 2015). The
IMF has revised its approach accordingly and has recognized the
importance of these tools.
2. Remove restrictions on performance requirements. As discussed above, FDI
may produce beneﬁts for host countries in terms of increased employment,
technology transfer, skills upgrading, and economic diversiﬁcation. However,
those beneﬁts are not automatic, and their appearance can depend on the policy
tools used by the host country and its e forts to encourage or even require the
foreign investment's integration into and engagement with the domestic
economy and actors. Those policy tools include measures to mandate or
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incentivize foreign investors to purchase or accord preferences to local suppliers
of goods or services, to employ domestic workers, to develop and implement
education and training programs, and to conduct higher-value-added activities,
such as research and development, in the host country. While these types of
measures may not always have their intended e fects, they have also been used
successfully to help ensure that countries and stakeholders within them
generate the beneﬁts that FDI can, but does not necessarily, o fer. (Johnson
2016).
As governments strive to harness private sector capital for sustainable
development objectives, it is unclear whether it makes sense to establish broad,
ex-ante bans on government use of these tools (o ten labeled as "performance
requirements"). There are already some key restrictions on performance
requirements in the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIMs) that have been agreed at the multilateral level. These are relatively
basic limits on government e forts to require foreign (and other) investors to use
local goods in ways that distort trade. The case for there being any global welfare
beneﬁts by going beyond those WTO-based limits, and imposing additional
legal constraints on government e forts to generate positive spillovers from FDI,
has not been made.
Example: The 2016 Dra t Pan African Code (PAIC) 
PAIC, developed under the auspices of the African Union Commission,
represents a new way of thinking about 'performance requirements' and
their impact on development. It explicitly allows states to impose
performance requirements and local content. Article 17 of the dra t PAIC
states: 
Member States may introduce performance requirements to promote
domestic investments and local content. Measures covered by this
Paragraph include, inter alia: 
a. measures to grant preferential treatment to any enterprise so
qualifying under the domestic law of a Member State in order to achieve
national or sub-national regional development goals; 
b. measures to support the development of local entrepreneurs; 
c. measures to enhance productive capacity, increase employment,
increase human resource capacity and training, research and
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development, including of new technologies, technology transfer,
innovation, and other beneﬁts of investment through the use of speciﬁed
requirements on investors; and 
d. measures to address historically-based economic disparities su fered by
identiﬁable ethnic or cultural groups due to discriminatory or oppressive
measures against such groups prior to the adoption of this Code.
3. Include policy carve-outs or protections. Increasingly, international
investment agreements include exceptions or carve-outs aiming to exclude
certain sectors, policy objectives, or government tools from the scope of the
treaty (or its dispute settlement mechanisms). In some cases, the treaties also
specify that determination regarding whether or not a measure is covered by
those exceptions or carve-outs is subject to a special dispute resolution system.
Example: Public Welfare Carve-outs 
The China-Australia FTA (2015) states that "Measures of a Party that are
non-discriminatory and for the legitimate public welfare objectives of
public health, safety, the environment, public morals or public order, shall
not be the subject of " an ISDS claim (see Article 9.11(4), (5) and (6)).
D. Limit Damages and Make Them More
Consistent
Under the current ISDS system, damage awards by arbitral tribunals di fer
substantially in comparable cases, and awards can be extremely large compared
to the ability of a host country to pay. The inconsistency and large size of awards
result from the fact that current IIAs provide very little guidance as to how
damages should be calculated, and give no consideration to the possible impact
of an award on the host country's economy. Standards such as Fair Market Value,
or restoring the investor to the position it would have been in without the host
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government action that caused the damages, provide only limited guidance to
tribunals.
1. Minimize inconsistencies in discount rates used. The majority of damages
calculations in cases of expropriation rely on attempts to calculate the Fair
Market Value (FMV) of assets taken. The most common method used to
calculate FMV is some version of discounted cash  low (DCF). Although the
claimant or the respondent sometimes proposes the use of "comparable
transactions" as an alternative to DCF to determine FMV, this approach has
generally not been accepted, since it has been so di ﬁcult to ﬁnd comparables
that are acceptable to a tribunal.
Awards based on DCF calculations are very sensitive to the discount rate that is
used. The implications of gaps between projections of cash  lows made by
claimants and respondents have o ten been dwarfed by the di ference in
discount rates they propose. In one of the ExxonMobil cases against Venezuela,
the claimant proposed a discount rate of around 5% while the respondent
argued for close to 20%. The impact of the di ferent rates amounted to billions
of dollars. In fact, a large part of the variations in damages in Venezuelan
expropriation cases resulted from the use of di ferent discount rates by
tribunals. And the major part of di ferences in proposed discount rates resulted
from the country risk premium that tribunals applied to projects that arguably
faced very similar risks. The question of whether IIAs could reduce the disparity
in damage calculations by addressing the relevance and determination of
country risk premium has not been addressed by critics of the system. Doing so
would reduce the variability of awards.
2. Ensure only sunk cost compensation for companies without a track record of
proﬁtability. The principal exception to the use by tribunals of DCF has been for
cases where the expropriation for FET violation involved an enterprise with no
track record of proﬁtability, such as a potential mine that has not actually
reached the production stage. In many such cases, tribunals have awarded only
the costs incurred by the investor, arguing that the projections required to use
DCF are too speculative to determine a damages award. On the other hand,
some tribunals have attempted to use DCF even when there is no track record
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that can be used to determine costs or even feasibility. The result of this di ferent
treatment in similar cases has been very dissimilar damage awards. Treaties
might call for the use of methods other than DCF when the project is highly
speculative, and especially when there is no on-going enterprise to base
projections on.
3. Provide exceptions for some government actions in extenuating
circumstances such as ﬁnancial crises. Award calculations have varied even in
the same country according to whether a tribunal accepts the argument that
government actions can be excused in the case of extenuating circumstances
during a ﬁnancial crisis. Thus, some tribunals made smaller awards in Argentina
during its ﬁnancial crisis by recognizing that adverse government actions
resulted from the ﬁnancial crisis itself, and therefore the government should be
excused from its obligations for a period. At the same time, other tribunals ruled
against extenuating circumstances, blaming the government's actions
themselves for creating the crisis. IIAs could possibly contain provisions that
excuse some government actions in a crisis.
4. Minimize inconsistencies in interest rates used. Tribunals have come to
di ferent conclusions about the rate of interest to be applied to damages for pre-
award and post-award periods. Parties have argued for the risk-free rate, the
investor's borrowing rate, the investor's rate of return on investments
("opportunity cost") or the same discount rate used for calculating a net present
value, and the borrowing rate of the host country. Moreover, parties have argued
for compound interest and for simple interest. Di ferent tribunals have accepted
di ferent arguments, while some appear simply to have chosen a rate
independent of the arguments. IIAs could resolve the inconsistency in rulings
(and reduce time and money spent in arguing for one or the other approach) by
specifying how interest is to be calculated.
5. Allow or require tribunals to consider the impact of awards on host
countries and limit severely damaging awards. Many claims under IIAs and
some awards might be considered to be so large that they would severely
damage the general economy and thus the population of a poor country. One
could argue that such large awards should not be made, regardless of the
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outcomes of calculations such as FMV. Another way of looking at the issue is to
accept that the harmful impact on the general population of a poor country due
to government actions should be limited.
A claim that is as big as a large portion of a country's foreign exchange reserves
or GDP might be considered so damaging to a poor country, if granted, that it
would be unconscionable. IIAs could be designed to limit awards that are too
destructive of economies in poor countries. Provision of some kind of limits on
individual awards, however, does not solve the problem of multiple claims
against a country that, in total, might be considered unconscionable. The
existence of an international investment court might allow the consolidation of
cases and enable the impact on the host country of multiple awards to be
considered. In the absence of such a court, IIAs could state that general concern
with the total awards against a host country might be excessively damaging and
leave it up to tribunals to take into account the impact of awards on poor
countries.
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10.3 REBALANCING: IMPOSING
DUTIES ON INVESTORS
Rebalancing international law with respect to investor duties means, following
the principle of reciprocity, that additional legal obligations are required of
investors to parallel the grant of rights they enjoy under IIAs.
What Would Be the Source of the Investor
Obligations?
There are several di ferent approaches that could be taken to impose obligations
on foreign investors within the international investment regime. The obligations
could be included within IIAs themselves, creating a rough symmetry with the
investor rights provisions. Under the existing model, this option could be
criticized on the grounds that it would entrust investment tribunals with the
authority to determine whether investors had violated their obligations.
However, another approach would be to use IIAs to require state parties to adopt
legislation to ensure appropriate accountability. Similar provisions are included
in international trade agreements on issues such as intellectual property law. Yet
another approach would be to include investor obligations in some new legal
instrument, a possibility we explore in Chapter 9.
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Example: Investor Obligations in an IIA 
Investor duties are included in the 2016 Dra t PAIC. Chapter 4, "Investor
Obligations," of the Dra t PAIC requires the investor to, inter alia, (i)
adhere to "socio-political obligations" including the "respect for national
sovereignty and observance of domestic laws, regulations and
administrative practices, respect for socio-cultural values, non-
interference in internal political a fairs, non interference in
intergovernmental relations, and respect for labor rights"; (ii) refrain
from bribery; (iii) observe corporate social responsibility obligations; (iv)
use natural resources in a responsible manner; and (v) observe business
ethics and human rights.
What Substantive Obligations Could Be
Imposed on Investors?
Basic Obligations
Developing countries hope to attract foreign investment in order to promote
sustainable economic development; the substantive obligations of investors'
local operations should re lect this purpose. At the most rudimentary level,
investors should conduct business activities in accordance with the laws of the
host country. Local operations should be integrated organically into the national
development plans of the host countries, and foreign investors should not abuse
their market power in the host country.
Additional Obligations
Beyond normal business activities, subsidiaries in host countries should also be
required to comply with existing relevant international standards. This could
include meeting the anti-corruption obligations detailed by the OECD
Convention, standards based on the UN Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights, and other global human rights norms and standards.
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Who Would Be Subject to the Obligations?
The subsidiaries of foreign investors should take on primary responsibility for
obligations of foreign direct investment in host countries. However, the
corporate parents and the home states should simultaneously take on joint
responsibility. The subsidiaries are part of the global operations of the parent
corporation and are subject to the parent corporation's global operation
strategies.
Every multinational enterprise has a home base and is a fected by the home
country's policies. Accordingly, obligations facing the subsidiaries should be
designed in coordination and conformity with requirements imposed on the
parent and the home state. Host countries frequently view the business
activities of foreign subsidiaries as a critical part of the national strategies of the
home country. On the other hand, home countries consider the protections of
the interest and investments of their foreign subsidiaries as part of their national
strategies.
The notion of a corporate nationality is o ten obscured in an era where many
western multinationals have footprints across the globe. Nonetheless, within a
speciﬁc context, we can always identify a single home state for the concerned
subsidiary operation on which to impose corresponding obligations. It can have
nothing to do with where the corporation initially originated. For instance, in the
previously discussed case, ExxonMobil was qualiﬁed as a Dutch enterprise
despite being based in the United States.
How Would These Rights Be Enforced?
In order to e fectively rebalance the foreign investment regime, a system of
investor obligations would need to be enforceable. An initial issue that would
need to be addressed would be the question of "standing": who would have the
right to seek enforcement of investor obligations? Presumably the host state
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government, at a minimum, would have the standing to enforce investor
obligations, but standing could also be extended to cover adversely a fected
communities, workers, or other stakeholders.
It would also be necessary to determine the appropriate form of dispute
settlement process. Options include the use of ad hoc arbitral tribunals (the
current model for investor rights under IIAs), a standing international judicial
body, domestic courts, and state-to-state dispute settlement.
A number of di ferent remedies could be made available for violations of
investor obligations. Within the current framework, a host state could be
permitted to raise a violation of investor obligations as an a ﬁrmative defense
that would preclude the investor's ability to bring a claim for alleged violations
of its rights under an IIA (an application of the "clean hands" doctrine).
Alternatively, violations of investor obligations could be a basis for reducing any
damages awards to foreign investors. Other forms of remedies, such as
injunctive relief, could be implemented through domestic legislation.
The above approaches, however, have limits. They rely on the investor bringing
the claim and allow the investor to deﬁne the party who is bringing the action
and the procedural rules and institution through which the claim will be heard.
Interested and a fected parties may not have a chance to have their voices heard
or meaningfully participate in the dispute, even if their rights and interests are
directly a fected.
If investment agreements speciﬁed that governments (or even a fected
communities) could bring claims through domestic courts against investors who
failed to live up to their obligations in the IIAs, this would potentially be much
more e fective in terms of creating widespread change in investor behavior. All
investors would then have strong incentives to take notice of these obligations,
rather than only those who were considering themselves bringing a claim.
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10.4 CONCLUSION
Guided by procedural principles (in particular subsidiarity and accountability of
states to their citizenry), this chapter has recommended reforms to allow states
the policy space to pursue sustainable development goals. Reforms such as
deﬁning investment clearly, narrowing interpretation of key doctrines such as
FET, removing restrictions on performance requirements, creating policy carve-
outs for priorities including protection of public health and the environment,
and including obligations for investors, all can potentially play a role in this
endeavor.
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11. REBALANCING
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
LAW: DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
11.1 REBALANCING: DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT
The reform of ISDS is motivated in part by the need to rebalance investor and
state rights, and in part by the need to address numerous procedural and rule-
of-law deﬁcits that have plagued investment arbitration and have been
criticized by parties on all parts of the spectrum.
Rebalancing investor-state rights in dispute settlement could involve, most
ambitiously, eliminating ISDS altogether. Short of that, such rebalancing
requires a number of reforms including modifying current exhaustion of
remedies doctrine, strengthening transparency rules, regulating or prohibiting
third-party funding, and restoring state-to-state arbitration as the primary non-
domestic dispute settlement forum for investment claims.
Addressing rule-of-law deﬁcits in the ISDS process could include other structural
reforms such as creating an appellate body or bodies, or establishing stronger
domestic review mechanisms; constructing a permanent arbitral court-style
mechanism; and strengthening the independence and impartiality of
adjudicators in other ways. While these steps would not resolve the more
fundamental concerns regarding the ISDS, they could improve certain aspects of
that mechanism.
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A ter ﬁrst laying out the case for ISDS reform, this section proceeds to the
various options for rebalancing dispute resolution and addressing procedural
and rule-of-law issues.
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11.2 WHAT ARE THE PROBLEMS
WITH ISDS?
The ISDS system is widely criticized as deﬁcient on a number of grounds,
including that it:
> privileges foreign investors over all other stakeholders,
> marginalizes domestic courts and institutions,
> expands interpretations of the IIA obligations,
> generates uncertainty in the law,
> lacks rule of law features, and
> enlists private arbitrators to adjudicate public concerns and interests.
Privileging Foreign Investors over All Other
Stakeholders
First, there is the fundamental structural question as to why foreign investors, as
a particular class of persons, should have access to a specialized form of
international dispute settlement that is available only to them and not to other
stakeholders.
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The special dispute settlement rights granted to foreign investors were
originally justiﬁed as a method of attracting more foreign investment to some
countries, under the assumption that increased foreign investment plays a
positive role in economic development. Yet, the empirical evidence about the
impact of IIAs on FDI  lows does not justify privileging foreign investors with a
bespoke system of international arbitration.
Marginalizing Domestic Courts and
Institutions
The ISDS system has led to the marginalization of domestic courts and legal
institutions that can o ten be bypassed as a result of provisions in IIAs. This may
have been justiﬁed at the genesis of the system with reference to concerns over
the quality of legal justice in certain host country jurisdictions, a concern which
has been widely addressed in many legal systems since decolonization.
Expanding Interpretations of the IIA
Obligations
The ISDS system as constituted allows jurisdictional provisions (such as
deﬁnitions of covered investors and investments) and investment law norms
(such as the FET standard) to be interpreted broadly to create new rights.
Indeed, some have argued that the current system of arbitrator compensation
magniﬁes this trend: because arbitrators are compensated based on the number
and duration of cases they hear, there is a ﬁnancial incentive for them to adopt
permissive approaches to the investor claims they entertain and accept. These
expansive interpretations, in turn, reduce state regulatory prerogatives and can
threaten decisions made for public interest purposes or through legitimate
domestic processes.
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Generating Uncertainty in the Law
There is no meaningful review mechanism to address incorrect decisions, nor to
ensure like cases are decided in like manner. This has allowed for an incoherent
and sometimes widely divergent set of rulings and legal theories. It is a
compounding problem, in that ever more expansive interpretations of IIA norms
are not checked by any higher legal authority. As a result, investors and states
face signiﬁcant di ﬁculties in understanding their rights and obligations.
Lacking Rule-of-Law Features
The ISDS mechanism has been widely criticized for a range of rule-of-law
deﬁcits. It is cited as contradicting principles of inequality under the law; being
insu ﬁciently transparent; failing to protect the rights and interests of non-
parties; lacking rules and tools for ensuring independence and impartiality of
adjudicators; and being devoid of meaningful review mechanisms to ensure
legal and factual correctness of awards and help promote consistent
interpretations of the law. These issues, in turn, erode trust in the process and
legitimacy of speciﬁc awards and the regime more broadly.
Appointing Private Arbitrators to Adjudicate
Public Concerns and Interests
Private arbitrators reviewing domestic conduct raise legitimacy concerns. The
system of party appointment and compensation, and the lack of strong ethical
rules, raise questions about the independence and impartiality of adjudicators.
Compounding those issues, decisions made by adjudicators are not subject to
meaningful appellate or judicial review.
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11.3 THE CASE FOR ABOLISHING
ISDS
Given the problems with ISDS identiﬁed above, one option for reform would be
to abolish ISDS as a form of dispute resolution altogether. In any case, it is
unclear why foreign investors should be treated more favorably than other
individuals bringing claims against governments. This is because foreign
investors have other legal fora in which to bring claims and they have access to
other means – beyond ISDS – to protect their interests. In addition, removing
ISDS may, as a side e fect, help build capacity in national courts.
The availability of other international legal fora. ISDS is not the only legal
forum open to foreign investors concerned about their treatment from
governments. They also have access to international and regional human rights
dispute settlement processes where they can bring claims about violations of
the most serious property rights issues. These dispute settlement processes are
considered su ﬁcient by the international community to deal with other equally
egregious issues, although their focus is not on awarding large-scale
compensation but rather o fering redress for wrongs.
The availability of other forms of protection for investors. Beyond seeking legal
redress, foreign investors can protect themselves in other ways. For instance,
they can take out political risk insurance from private or public entities in order
to obtain ﬁnancial compensation for at least some of the same kinds of issues
Rebalancing International Investment Law: Dispute Settlement
117
that are covered under IIAs. Protection for many other issues that are crucial to
human well-being are dealt with primarily through insurance systems (e.g.
recompense for the destruction of a person's home). While in their current form,
political risk policies are unlikely to provide the same level of coverage as a
successful claim through the current ISDS process, increased reliance on such
policies could support a case for expanding coverage that is o fered.
Building capacity in the national court system. One common argument for
retaining ISDS is that the national court systems of some host countries are
incapable of fairly addressing claims by foreign investors. However, as UNCTAD
has observed: "Rather than focusing exclusively on ISDS, domestic reforms
aimed at fostering sound and well-working legal and judicial institutions in host
states are important. This may ultimately help remedy some of the host-state
institutional deﬁciencies which IIAs and the ISDS mechanism were designed to
address." In other words, by abolishing ISDS, there may be a renewed e fort to
build capacity in national court systems. Moreover, a side e fect of abolishing
ISDS may be to add pressure from foreign investors to the push to build capacity
in local courts, since investors would not have an alternative to support their
claims. On the other hand, previous e forts to reform the judicial system of many
developing countries have not made much progress. Added pressure from
foreign investors is not likely to be su ﬁcient to e fect reforms that have thus far
failed.
Utilizing state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms. In the absence of
ISDS, the investor's home state can challenge a host state's IIA breach through
state-to-state dispute settlement. Most existing treaties already contain
mechanisms for state-to-state dispute resolution alongside their ISDS
provisions. Some IIAs, such as the treaty between Australia and the US, and the
treaties concluded by Brazil with a number of countries in recent years, similarly
opted not to include ISDS provisions. This option is discussed in more detail
below.
Abolishing ISDS represents a clear case of rebalancing investor and state rights
towards restoring state regulatory authority.
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11.4 REFORM OF ISDS
In the event that ISDS remains a part of the regime, this section outlines some
reforms that could improve ISDS, both from a rebalancing perspective and a
rule-of-law perspective. The latter includes reforms to the institutional structure
as well as procedural reforms.
1. ISDS Reforms that Help Rebalance Investor
and State Rights
A. Exhaustion of Local Remedies
One idea for reforming the process of ISDS is to require foreign investors to
resort to domestic courts in the host state to resolve their dispute before
bringing an international claim. This requirement, known as "exhaustion of local
remedies," is a fundamental principle of international law that is applied both
when individuals ask their governments to bring claims on their behalf against
other governments, and in human rights cases. Although some early investment
treaties contained this requirement, most modern IIAs do not. Moreover, even
those treaties that include an exhaustion clause generally impose a very short
time limit (e.g., 18 months) during which the investor must pursue their claim in
domestic courts.
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An exhaustion of local remedies requirement o fers numerous beneﬁts, starting
with respecting the legitimate jurisdiction of domestic judicial systems from
unnecessary encroachment by international institutions. It would also help to
rebalance some of the asymmetries in the ISDS system, reducing the procedural
advantages that foreign investors enjoy over both host state governments and
other constituencies (such as domestic investors, environmental and labor
organizations) that lack comparable access to international dispute settlement
processes.
The local remedies rule could further help to promote the rule of law by adding
pressure for strengthening domestic legal systems and helping to integrate
them with the international investment regime. For developing countries,
encouraging the resolution of foreign investment disputes through the domestic
courts would provide an opportunity to clarify the legal standards applicable to
both foreign and domestic investment, such as the procedures and criteria for
granting licenses or permits for resource extraction.
The rule could also improve the functioning of ISDS tribunals by clarifying both
the factual record and the relevant principles of domestic law. Many investment
disputes turn on the extent to which changes in regulatory policy interfere with
an investor's "legitimate expectations" about the value of an investment. It is
di ﬁcult to assess whether an investor's expectations are "legitimate" without a
clear understanding of both the relevant facts involved and the legal framework
in which the investment was made. These issues are presumably more within
the competence of a domestic court than an international investment tribunal.
However, to be e fective, the exhaustion of local remedies requirement would
need to meet certain criteria. First, to avoid overly narrow interpretations by
investment tribunals, the exhaustion requirement should be made an explicit
condition of host states' consent to arbitration. Second, the investor should be
required to pursue domestic remedies for a period of time that is reasonable to
accommodate the procedures of a domestic legal system (ie ﬁve years). Third,
any "futility" exception to the exhaustion requirement should be narrowly
dra ted to require evidence of corruption or some other speciﬁc lack of capacity
on the part of the domestic courts.
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Example: Exhaustion of Local Remedies Requirement in IIAs 
India's new Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (2015) contains a limited
exhaustion of local remedies requirement. It requires foreign investors to
pursue their claims in domestic court for at least ﬁve years before bringing
an international claim.
B. Transparency of Arbitral Awards and Decisions
In some, but not all, cases, arbitral awards, decisions and ﬁlings under IIAs are
made public. If ISDS is to be retained, all documents associated with the
arbitration, including the award, should be made public, irrespective of the
forum for resolution of the dispute (subject to the protection of conﬁdential
information such as information related to national security). Transparency
ensures public trust in the system as well as its legitimacy.
Without transparency, ﬁlings (including pleadings, expert reports, and briefs of
parties and amicus curiae), decisions and awards are known only to the
arbitrators and counsel in the individual dispute. As these individuals can be
retained by parties in future disputes, this can have the e fect of creating private
law known only to insiders and can result in advantages for a limited group of
individuals, enabling them to charge increased fees that in turn increase the
costs of bringing disputes.
The lack of transparency also prevents those who are a fected by the very nature
of the issues at dispute in ISDS from following and participating in disputes and
scrutinizing such awards. This is particularly cogent as ISDS evaluates
government regulatory decisions, regulations that a fect the public at large.
Transparency is therefore essential to guarantee public conﬁdence in the
fairness of the dispute resolution process.
Example: UNCITRAL Transparency Rules 
The following are excerpts from the UNCITRAL's Transparency Rules: 
1. Subject to article 7 [covering conﬁdential or protected information], the 
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following documents shall be made available to the public: the notice of
arbitration, the response to the notice of arbitration, the statement of
claim, the statement of defence and any further written statements or
written submissions by any disputing party; a table listing all exhibits to
the aforesaid documents and to expert reports and witness statements, if
such table has been prepared for the proceedings, but not the exhibits
themselves; any written submissions by the non-disputing Party (or
Parties) to the treaty and by third persons, transcripts of hearings, where
available; and orders, decisions and awards of the arbitral tribunal. 
2. Subject to article 7, expert reports and witness statements, exclusive of
the exhibits thereto, shall be made available to the public, upon request by
any person to the arbitral tribunal. 
3. Subject to article 7, the arbitral tribunal may decide, on its own
initiative or upon request from any person, and a ter consultation with
the disputing parties, whether and how to make available exhibits and
any other documents provided to, or issued by, the arbitral tribunal not
falling within paragraphs 1 or 2 above.
C. Restricting Third-Party Funding
A third procedural reform that would improve ISDS is restricting third-party
funding (TPF). Generally speaking, TPF involves a speculative investor making an
investment in a claim in dispute, in return for some degree of control over the
case and a contingent stake in the recovery. The use of TPF is a relatively recent
phenomenon, the practice having been banned earlier. The rationale for the
acceptance of this formerly forbidden practice was the hope that it would
increase access to justice for impecunious or poorly funded claimants.
TPF in investment arbitration (Investment TPF) began in the early 2000s and
grew dramatically a ter the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis, driven in part by
speculative ﬁnance managers looking for new investment vehicles. TPF funders
now routinely market TPF to traditional FDI investors as a tool for balance sheet
management in the event of a dispute. The success of this e fort has led to the
dramatic increases in the number of TPF-funded claims (Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia
Olivet 2012).
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Allowing speculative ﬁnance into ISDS as it stands brings a highly-capitalized
set of non-direct investors into a dispute mechanism with incentives that are
unrelated to the goals of the system. This increases the number of claims ﬁled,
the number of weaker claims pursued (for either settlement or precedent value),
and the number of cases not settled outside arbitration in the hopes of a larger
recovery, driving host country costs upwards. TPF funders target claims against
less developed and less well-resourced states. This threatens to transform the
ISDS system into an extraction mechanism for wealth transfers from developing
country citizens to well-funded ﬁnancial speculators, instead of a system
intended to protect development capital for the good of investors and host
states. For these reasons, TPF in investment arbitration is at best a distortion of
the investment system and at worst a deliberate exploitation of the weaknesses
and deﬁcits of the system for the beneﬁt of speculative ﬁnance (Garcia 2018).
TPF should be banned from ISDS through revisions to current and future IIAs,
changes to domestic laws, and changes to arbitral rules. However, if banning is
not feasible, TPF should be regulated. First, IIAs, investment contracts and the
rules of arbitral associations should require mandatory disclosure of the
presence of TPF in a given case and, most importantly, mandatory disclosure of
the terms of the funding agreement. Second, where TPF is found to be involved,
the tribunal should order mandatory security for costs, so that in the event the
TPF-funded claimant loses, the state has access to funds to reimburse it for its
legal costs (Thrasher 2018).
Example: TPF Funding 
A recent example of TPF funding is found in Teinver, S.A. et al. v.
Argentina (2017). In that case, Burford Capital, a leading third-party
funder, funded a claim against Argentina in a case involving a valuation
dispute between Argentina and Teinver and two other Spanish investors.
Argentina stepped in and expropriated two airlines, claiming that
mismanagement had driven the airlines into insolvency. An arbitration
tribunal returned an award in excess of $325 million. Burford Capital
invested approximately $13 million in the matter and sold its interest on
the secondary market for $107 million, a gain of $94.2 million and a
736% return on its investment.
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D. State-to-State Arbitration
A ﬁnal reform option would be to limit dispute resolution in IIAs to state-to-
state arbitration. State-to-state arbitration involves states initiating claims
against a treaty party arguing violations of the IIA, without the direct
involvement of the investor. The practice is already commonly found in IIA
provisions, although in many cases it is limited to resolving issues of
interpretation or application of the treaty rather than directed at resolving
substantive claims under the treaty.
The notion of state-to-state arbitration on the substance of IIA claims was a
common provision found in Friendship, Commerce and Navigation treaties.
Essentially, this was a type of diplomatic protection claim for violations su fered
by a state’s nationals. Such provisions can still be found in modern treaties (see
Box below)
Limiting dispute resolution under IIAs to state-to-state arbitration o fers several
beneﬁts, including enabling home states to protect a large class of similarly
a fected foreign investors through a class action or protecting individual
investors who either cannot a ford to initiate an action or fear retaliation or
discrimination by the host state for initiating such an action. State-to-state
arbitration would also necessarily limit the number of claims that could be
initiated as it would be impractical for states to have to defend all investor
claims. Moreover, the practice would limit the expansive interpretations given to
IIA provisions as the state bringing the action would be conscious that expansive
interpretations could be detrimental to its own interests when it becomes the
defendant state in future claims initiated by the other treaty party.
At the same time, state-to-state arbitration re-politicizes dispute settlement in
IIAs. States would be given the power to pick and choose which investor claims it
wanted to pursue, which could be driven by the state's ideology. The practice
could also subject capital-importing to abuses from diplomatic protection by
capital-exporting states. Reisman has argued that ISDS is essential as it
separates investor claims from "the caprice" of politics between states, a beneﬁt
which is lost in state-to-state arbitration. However, the beneﬁts of the practice
may outweigh this loss to investors.
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Example: State-to-State Provisions in IIAs 
The US Model BIT o fers state-to-state arbitration both for the
interpretation of IIA provisions as well as for its application. As article
37(1) notes: [A]ny dispute between the Parties concerning the
interpretation or application of this Treaty, that is not resolved through
consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall be submitted on the
request of either Party to arbitration for a binding decision or award by a
tribunal in accordance with applicable rules of international law
2. Institutional/Rule of Law Reforms
As an institution designed to promote justice in the area of international
investment law, ISDS lacks some of the fundamental hallmarks of legitimacy
that characterize a judicial system. For one, it does not allow for the correction of
erroneous or con licting awards, which could be addressed by establishing an
appellate system. Secondly, it relies exclusively on ad hoc arbitration, which
prevents reliance on procedural e ﬁciencies, consistency in decision-making,
and a permanent body of decision-makers that a specialized international
investment court could provide. Finally, it uses ad hoc arbitrators whose
independence may be compromised. This section looks at three alternatives to
improving ISDS from an institutional perspective. These are creating an
appellate system to review arbitral decisions, establish an international
investment court, and improving the composition of arbitrators.
These reforms, while primarily motivated by rule of law and procedural fairness
concerns, have a secondary rebalancing e fect. Given that the current ISDS
system produces inconsistent arbitral rulings and has over the past several years
seen an increasingly expansive interpretation of fundamental treaty norms that
favor investors, the implementation of these rule of law reforms could be
expected to restore state policy space under the current status quo.
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A. Expanding Review Mechanisms
International investment law allows only limited review of arbitral decisions.
This is done in order to enable proceedings to be conducted with relative speed
and to help ensure awards are ﬁnal and easily enforceable. But these policy
goals come with tradeo fs. One is that the limited scope of review means that
countries may be bound to awards that violate fundamental principles of their
domestic law. Another is that it binds countries to adverse awards even when
those awards are legally or factually incorrect. And a third is that limited review
has resulted in the same treaty provisions being interpreted in inconsistent
ways.
In an e fort to improve the legitimacy and consistency of the ISDS procedures,
one reform approach is therefore to expand scope and opportunity for review of
ISDS awards. This could be accomplished by expanding grounds for domestic
court review. Another option is to create an avenue for substantive appeals vis-a-
vis arbitral rules, which could enable arbitral awards to be appealed to either an
existing institutional body or to a dedicated international investment appellate
body, similar to the WTO Appellate Body.
Example: The WTO Appellate Body 
The WTO Appellate Body is a standing body of seven persons that hears
appeals from decisions issued by trade panels in disputes brought by WTO
Members. The Appellate Body members are to be broadly representative
of membership in the WTO. They are appointed for four-year terms, which
may be renewed once. The Appellate Body can uphold, modify, or reverse
the ﬁndings of a panel. Appellate Body Reports, once adopted by the
Dispute Settlement Body, are ﬁnal and made public.
B. An International Investment Court System
A second option for improving the legitimacy of ISDS is to replace it with an
investment court system that would hear investor-state disputes in lieu of
traditional ad hoc arbitration tribunals. The European Union has proposed such a
system and is attempting to include it in all of its future IIAs. The EU Model 
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contemplates the establishment of a two-tiered standing court with a tribunal of
ﬁrst instance and an appeal tribunal. Both tribunals are designed to be sta fed
by a permanent roster of judges for a term of at least six years. Judges would be
paid a monthly retainer fee to ensure their availability and independence.
Reliance on a court system, rather than ad hoc arbitration, is also advocated in
the model of the Arab Investment Court (AIC), established under the Uniﬁed
Agreement for the Investment of Arab Capital in the Arab States (Uniﬁed
Agreement). Article 25 of the United Agreement requires disputes to be settled
by way of conciliation or arbitration or by recourse to the Arab Investment Court.
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The dispute settlement system of the Uniﬁed Agreement is described in the
chart below.
DIAGRAM Arab Uniﬁed Investment Agreement Dispute Settlement Model
Under the Uniﬁed Agreement, investors have primary recourse to conciliation
and/or arbitration. Only if conciliation and/or arbitration has not been
conclusive, or if the disputing parties fail to agree to submit the dispute to
conciliation or arbitration, can investors seek recourse to the AIC. However, the
AIC is not an appeal organ.
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The AIC model could inspire the design of a reform to ISDS where a court and
ISDS simultaneously exist. Investors could thus be given the choice of either
going directly to arbitration or proceeding to an investment court. The court
could further provide guidance on investment matters by issuing interpretations
of issues that are commonly at issue in arbitrations, as the AIC does.
One concern that has been raised about specialized courts established to hear a
certain type of claims by a certain type of actors, however, is that it "may be
prone to resolve disputes in ways that aggrandize its role, which is to say, to
reach decisions that will induce investors to assert more claims" (Dreyfuss 2016:
889).
C. Independence of Arbitrators in Investment Dispute
Settlement Bodies
Another important area for reform is the process for appointing and assuring the
independence of members of investment tribunals. Under the current system,
tribunals typically are comprised of three members: one appointed by the
investor, one by the host state, and the third member – the "President" of the
tribunal – by agreement of the Parties (or by an appointing authority if no
agreement can be reached). This process provides investors with an
unprecedented role in "choosing their own judges" in disputes that frequently
involve important issues of public policy.
In addition, arbitrators frequently represent investors as counsel in other
investment arbitration proceedings, creating a signiﬁcant risk of con licts of
interest. Currently, a party to an arbitration can challenge an arbitrator on
various grounds. The challenge may be reviewed by other members of the
tribunal or by an ad hoc review panel. Critics of the system believe that reviewers
are very hesitant to disqualify an arbitrator.
To increase the legitimacy of the system, arbitrators, members of an investment
appellate body, or an investment court, should be appointed by the relevant
governments establishing the system. In addition, to guarantee independence,
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they should either be permanent members of the dispute resolution body with a
regular salary, or their ﬁnancial independence should otherwise be ensured.
Arbitrators or judges should further be subject to appropriate con lict of interest
standards that would, at a minimum, preclude them from acting as counsel for
private parties in other disputes. Moreover, arbitrators should be appointed on
the basis of holding demonstrable expertise relevant to the range of social and
environmental as well as economic issues relevant to the case on which they are
adjudicating.
Example: Arbitrator Independence 
In AWG Group v. Argentina (2007), Argentina attempted to disqualify
the claimant-appointed arbitrator, Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, on the
grounds of con lict of interest. Kaufmann-Kohler had recently been
appointed as a non-executive director at an international bank whose
investment portfolio included an interest in one of the claimants. The
challenge was heard and rejected by the two other members of the
tribunal, which noted, ﬁrst, that Kaufmann-Kohler had been unaware of
the bank’s investment and, in any event, that the investment did not
compromise her independence or impartiality, among other things,
because the size was not material. The decision was upheld by a U.S. court
when Argentina ﬁled to vacate the ultimate award.
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11.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has set out a series of reforms that would support a more
transparent, accountable, and participatory dispute settlement process. It also
envisages national courts playing a much greater role in the system by
demanding that investors exhaust domestic remedies. But more fundamentally,
it has argued that abolishment of ISDS is justiﬁed by the fact that there is no
compelling reason why foreign investors should be treated any more favorably
than other individuals bringing claims against governments. No procedural
principles demand such treatment, nor is it likely to produce increased
investment that will signiﬁcantly contribute to the kind of economic, social and
environmental goals at the heart of sustainable development.
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12. REALIGNING
INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT
LAW WITH 21ST
CENTURY GLOBAL
PRIORITIES
12.1 A NEW INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR
INVESTMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
Strategies to Realign Investment Law with
21st-Century Goals and Priorities
A paradigm shi t is necessary to make international investment align with and
support the goals of reducing host country poverty and inequality, maintaining
and improving host country health and environmental needs, and assuring
human dignity for all.
The available tools of multilateral and bilateral investment treaties, investor-
state contracts, and mechanisms for resolving disputes, need to be restructured
to address the e fects of globalization while providing a supportive and secure
basis for investment. The ﬁrst step in this realignment is for home countries,
their investors, and host countries to reassess their domestic laws and use of
investment treaties and investor-host country agreements and to align them
with the strategic principles developed in this book.
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A second, more ambitious strategy involves the negotiation of a carefully
calibrated multilateral framework agreement on sustainable investment.
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12.2 THE NEED FOR
MULTILATERAL ACTION ON
INVESTMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
In addition to reforming the existing IIA regime, there are certain issues related
to foreign investment and sustainable development that, under the principle of
subsidiarity discussed in chapter 6, are appropriate subjects of cooperation and
governance at the multilateral level. The mobility of capital, the problem of
fragmentation of international law, and the linkages between foreign
investment and global challenges such as climate change, suggest that certain
aspects of foreign investment governance would best be addressed in a new
multilateral legal instrument. This chapter discusses areas of successful
multilateral cooperation that could serve as models and identiﬁes some speciﬁc
areas that could be addressed in such an agreement.
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DIAGRAM The Need for Multilateral Solutions
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Examples of Successful Multilateral Action:
Intellectual Property, Public Health, and Tax
As discussed below, although the adoption of a multilateral agreement
addressing investment and sustainable development may seem unlikely in the
current political climate, examples of successful multilateral action addressing
global priorities can be found in a number of key economic and social sectors.
Intellectual Property
Rights holders achieved the globalization of intellectual property rights by
deﬁning them as trade issues and incorporating them into the trade regime
with the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs). This
regime, like the current international investment regime, also faced a crisis. In
the early 2000s, Brazil, South Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and Thailand faced a
devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic. In 2000, in Africa alone, 20.66 million people
were infected (Roser and Ritchie, 2018). Policymakers in these regions quickly
recognized the connection between their intellectual property commitments
and the high prices of patented antiretrovirals to treat HIV/AIDS. The price of
pharmaceutical proﬁts versus unnecessary deaths (due to una fordability)
mobilized civil society and brought pressure on governments to take action that
would result in increased a fordability and availability of the requisite
antiretrovirals.
In November 2001, at the outset of the WTO Doha Round of trade negotiations,
the African Group and Brazil announced that they would refuse to negotiate any
trade issues until governments agreed to a declaration stating that nothing in
TRIPs should prevent governments from addressing their public health needs.
The result was the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health
that a ﬁrmed government policy space to prioritize health over patent
protection. A number of countries have availed themselves of  lexibilities in
TRIPs, such as seizing patents through compulsory licensing with compensation
to allow generic production and importing cheaper patented drugs from abroad
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(parallel importing). Thus, both multilateral and domestic strategies (enabled
by  lexibilities in the treaty) have allowed states to reclaim some policy space to
promote policies more aligned with sustainable development.
Public Health
In 2003, 168 states signed a landmark tobacco treaty, the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control. The treaty came into force in 2005 and is legally
binding in the 181 ratifying countries. In March 2006, Uruguay implemented
new anti-smoking laws in line with the WHO treaty's provisions that included
plain packaging requirements. Despite the fact that Uruguay's laws were
compliant with the WHO treaty provisions, Philip Morris brought an ISDS claim
against Uruguay. Uruguay won the case. This example suggests a strategy of
exploiting di ferences between various treaty regimes (multilateral health vs.
bilateral investment) to stake a claim for prioritizing health, or any other
comparable non-economic goal.
Tax policies
Taxation is another realm in which countries compete to attract investment.
Particularly in the area of corporate taxation, there has been a steady trend of
reduced corporate tax rates. In the case of mobile economic activity, competition
has gone beyond tax rates to include incentives, such as so-called "patent box"
regimes, targeted at mobile assets.
Multinational taxpayers have been found to take full advantage of available
leakage in tax systems by shi ting proﬁts from high to low-tax countries through
the use of transfer pricing and other techniques to erode the tax base in high-tax
countries. In some cases, taxpayers have avoided taxation by the host and the
home country, achieving what is referrred to as "stateless income." In response to
public outcry and resulting political pressures, the G20/OECD project to combat
tax base erosion and proﬁt shi ting (BEPS) achieved broad agreement on new
international standards to combat BEPS that are being implemented by
countries to varying degrees.
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One of the hurdles to implementing these changes was the international
network of bilateral income tax treaties. The solution is an innovative
multilateral legal instrument to amend bilateral income tax treaties necessary
to implement BEPS standards under a unifying framework of a single
instrument that o fers  lexibility to signing countries to: (i) identify the treaties it
is willing to amend; and (ii) identify optional amendments that it agrees to
adopt in those treaties it proposes to amend, in addition to the minimum
standards required by the treaty. More than 75 countries have agreed to amend
income tax treaties under this instrument (subject to individual country
ratiﬁcation procedures), which entered into force on 1 July 2018.
Example: A Multililateral Convention on Tax 
In connection with the BEPS project relating to cross-border taxation, the
G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors issued a mandate to
the OECD to prepare a Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty-
Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shi ting
("Multilateral Instrument" or "MLI"). The MLI was negotiated by 100
countries in November 2016, has been signed by over 75 countries, and
entered into force on 1 July 2018, following ﬁnal ratiﬁcation by the
requisite minimum number of countries.
As an innovative tool to achieve rapid alignment of existing treaties with
modernized international standards, the MLI may be a particularly promising
multilateral model for amendment of existing IIAs towards realignment with
21st-century global priorities. A similar model is the United Nations Convention
on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, adopted in 2014.
That treaty, which is also known as the "Mauritius Convention," aims to provide
states an e ﬁcient and e fective means of modifying their existing IIAs to enable
increased transparency of ISDS proceedings.
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12.3 A FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON
INVESTMENT AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
At the 2016 Hangzhou G20 summit, trade ministers agreed on G20 Guiding
Principles for Global Investment Policymaking that outlined nine general
principles to promote inclusive economic growth and sustainable development,
setting a path forward for global investment cooperation. The Guiding Principles
were ﬁrst dra ted by UNCTAD, and were pushed forward at the summit by China
as the hosting state. They were the result of cooperative deliberation among
major capital importing and exporting states. The G20 accounts for 74 percent of
global inward FDI stock and 81 percent of global outward FDI stock, as of 2015
(Zhan 2016).
Although the Guiding Principles are not legally enforceable, they could provide a
foundation for governments to build upon by negotiating a "Framework
Convention on Sustainable Investment." The Framework Convention could
promote a more robust approach to reconciling the governance of international
investment with sustainable development.
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Potential elements of the Convention include the following:
The Framework Convention could help to reduce the fragmentation of
international law by clarifying the Parties' intent that the provisions of
investment treaties should be construed to avoid con lict with human
rights and environmental treaties.
The Convention could provide a mechanism for modifying the terms of
bilateral and regional investment treaties among the Parties to the
Convention in order to implement some of the reforms discussed above
in Sections 7.2 and 7.3, modeled on the Multilateral Legal Instrument
on taxation discussed above.
The Convention could also establish broad principles for the regulation
of foreign investors and investment. The Framework Convention
approach would permit more detailed, enforceable investor
obligations to be developed and enforced through the adoption of
subsequent protocols and national legislation. For example, the
Convention could require participating governments to:
coordinate policy on climate change,
refrain from tax and subsidy competition to attract foreign
investment,
hold transnational corporations accountable for resultant harms in
host countries, and
conduct sustainability impact assessments before approving
signiﬁcant foreign investments in sensitive sectors (such as
extractive industries, infrastructure, and essential services).
Climate change
In order to tackle the challenge of climate change, global cooperation and
coordination are necessary. There is a concern that while countries taking action
to reduce emissions may be providing global beneﬁts, the costs of their
1
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mitigation e forts will be concentrated locally, creating a cost-beneﬁt equation
that can act as a powerful deterrent to unilateral action.
Country A adopts stringent emissions standards or a carbon tax that
increases the costs of doing business in that country. As a result, energy-
intensive manufacturing facilities and other associated operations may
move to countries that have not adopted similar measures. FDI into
Country A may drop, while outward, e ﬁciency-seeking FDI from Country
A will rise. Countries that fail to take similarly stringent measures would
likely beneﬁt from their climate inaction as companies move or establish
their operations to the least costly jurisdictions. Emissions would not be
reduced, and may even increase rapidly.
Climate policy can thus impact FDI  lows, and government policies on
investment attraction and retention can similarly impact climate-related
outcomes. Recognizing these links, it is important to assess whether and how
international investment law and policy can be used to advance (and at least not
undermine) global collaboration on climate change.
This could be done, for instance, by:
> specifying that states must adopt and not derogate from policies aiming
to implement their nationally determined contributions under the Paris
Agreement;
> including mechanisms enabling state parties and other citizens to use
international investment treaties to raise and challenge states' failures to
adhere to globally agreed climate mitigation commitments;
> establishing commitments to cooperate on promoting the transfer of
climate-friendly technologies;
> imposing disciplines on fossil fuel subsidies; and
> encouraging investment for the production and distribution of
renewable energy.
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Incentives Competition
Governments around the world are competing for capital (Tavares-Lehman
2016). In order to attract and keep FDI, governments (and the cities, states, or
provinces within them) o ten o fer ﬁnancial, ﬁscal, and regulatory incentives
schemes. While the winning bidder may ultimately get or keep the project, its
net gains are less than they would have been without the competitive
incentives, and indeed may be less than the beneﬁts generated by the project.
Even the winner therefore loses, and countries with limited resources to engage
in these competitions may ﬁnd themselves consistently failing to attract or keep
coveted investments.
Within and across countries, there have been few successful initiatives to limit
such competition. But some exceptions exist. In the EU, for instance, where
countries are required to let capital move freely across their borders, they are
also signiﬁcantly limited in terms of their ability to use locational incentives to
outbid their fellow European member states for investment projects. As
investment treaties enable, encourage and, in some cases, require easy
movement of ﬁrms and capital, it similarly makes sense for them to include
disciplines preventing costly and wasteful incentives schemes. Presently,
however, such provisions (or related monitoring and enforcement mechanisms)
are absent from international investment treaties, representing a missed
opportunity for global cooperation on a crucial FDI-related issue.
Holding Transnational Corporations Accountable
One concern about the foreign investment activities of multinational enterprises
is that it is extremely di ﬁcult to hold corporate actors liable for harms they
cause in the host state. The cross-border and o ten extremely complex nature of
their structures, combined with legal norms on separate legal personality, and
the limited liability of shareholders, all contribute to this problem. This is a well-
recognized problem and one that an international Convention on investment
could be well-suited to address.
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Sustainability Impact Assessments
Sustainability impact assessments (SIAs) o fer an approach to explore the
economic, environmental and social impacts of foreign investments. They
involve a process by which foreign investors can assess the potential economic,
social (including human rights) and environmental impacts of their investment
before the investment is established. Their focus is on broadening the investor's
view of the e fects of the investment beyond simply a cost-beneﬁt analysis to
include non-market, non-monetised factors. Good SIAs generally involve
stakeholder participation in assessing the impacts and the use of a range of
quantitative and qualitative methods to transparently assess key impacts in
relation to the assessment. Moreover, the depth and the scope of the impact
assessment should align with the signiﬁcance of the foreign investment,
ensuring that the process is proportionate.
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12.4 CONCLUSION
Despite the current skepticism about the prospects for implementing a new
multilateral bargain for international investment and sustainable development,
noteworthy multilateral successes have been achieved in equally contentious
areas of global social and economic policy. A new multilateral framework to
address a range of interconnected problems identiﬁed in this book could be
transformative. Issues like the mobility of capital, climate change and the
fragmentation of international law associated with international investment
and sustainable development cannot be solved by states acting alone.
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13. LOOKING
AHEAD
13.1 LOOKING AHEAD – 
A PARADIGM SHIFT IN
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
LAW
The individual reforms discussed in this book are driven by an overarching vision
that the international investment regime is a form of governance that must
contribute to key societal goals (Roberts 2013; Garcia et al. 2015). This is a
departure from the way in which the regime is currently conceptualized by its
proponents as a system to provide investor beneﬁts in the hope that those
beneﬁts will spill over to others. The objective of this book is to change the terms
of the whole debate so that the values and goals elaborated here are at the
center of discussions about each individual reform process. To lay the
groundwork for such fundamental change, this book advocates the following:
A change to policy debates around international investment law.
International investment law has, in part, been justiﬁed by rationales
(o ten connected to practitioners within the regime) that fail to engage
with the broader justice and governance concerns set out in this book.
Now is the time to genuinely and robustly address justice and
governance concerns as central to policy debates throughout the
international investment ﬁeld.
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A change to the institutional actors who formulate, implement and
enforce investment law. National and international law on
international investment is formulated and negotiated by government
o ﬁcials who reside in ministries of foreign a fairs, trade, or commerce.
Foreign a fairs and trade ministries are institutionally charged with
increasing integration (measured by trade and investment  lows), as
well as strengthening formal and informal ties to other nations. In
addition, international investment law continues to be enforced by
arbitrators whose background and experience are within a narrow
investment law community. We need to encourage existing actors to
engage with this paradigm shi t, and to include institutional actors
from a far broader range of backgrounds , in order to ensure that values
such as sustainable development, human rights, and environmental
justice are put at the heart of international investment law.
A more consistent public engagement with the current international
investment regime. There have been high-proﬁle moments when the
international investment regime has permeated the broader public
consciousness and led to moments of crisis for the enactment of new
IIAs or cases brought through existing IIAs (e.g. Philip Morris v. Uruguay).
In spite of this, countries continue to sign ever more treaties, and
investors continue to ﬁle ever more cases, with minimal system
reforms on the horizon. Promoting deeper forms of civic engagement
to create a more globalized and persistent movement, making a
compelling case to policymakers for more substantive and holistic
reform, would be a worthwhile endeavor. Despite the current
skepticism about the prospects for implementing a new multilateral
bargain for international investment and sustainable development,
noteworthy multilateral successes have been achieved in equally
contentious areas of global social and economic policy.
In conclusion, this book has argued that the current widespread dissatisfaction
with the international investment regime is no surprise in light of its lack of
alignment with the global challenges of the 21st century. Even in purely
economic terms, the case for the current international investment regime is
2
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hardly robust. This is unfortunate, because well-governed international
investment can be a powerful tool for sustainable development.
This book provides three conceptual tools that can help us move beyond the
current impasse:
Re-think the international investment regime to see it as an
incomplete and unbalanced system of governance,
Re-balance the existing system by reforming aspects that are
incompatible with principles of good governance, and
Re-align the system away from a narrow focus on expanding
investment  lows towards a more inclusive set of objectives.
Perhaps the most important and ﬁrst step in this reform process should be
consideration by all actors of the paradigm shi t that this book recommends
with respect to understanding investment law in the 21st century. Individual
substantive or procedural reforms may well be quite important and could be
pursued for a number of overlapping reasons, but this book recommends
something more fundamental: a completely new way of understanding
investment law, which can, in turn, o fer a framework for evaluating and
executing the many substantive, procedural and strategic decisions ahead.
Towards that end, this book does not try to suggest a single recipe for how the
governance system should look. Instead, it provides ingredients that can be
combined e fectively – now and in the future. It is hoped that by pursuing these
strategies, a 21st-century investment law that has been rethought, rebalanced,
and realigned can make a signiﬁcant contribution towards a more sustainable
development process and a more equitable future for all.
1
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14. ANNEX
14.1 ANNEX: A PRIMER ON
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT
AND ITS GOVERNANCE
What is International Investment?
There are several di ferent types of investment which may be broadly referred to
as international investment (synonymously "foreign investment," or "cross-
border investment"). The principal categories of these are:
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is one type of cross-border investment. FDI is
deﬁned as the result of an individual or enterprise of one country (Country A)
investing in an entity in another country (Country B) with the aim of establishing
a strategic, long-term interest in and management control or in luence over that
Country B entity. An FDI investor is commonly referred to as the parent company
and the foreign entity may be referred to as a subsidiary, a branch, or more
generally an a ﬁliate. Given the di ﬁculty in determining intent or fact of
management control or in luence, su ﬁcient degree of control to qualify as FDI is
generally assumed to exist when the foreign entity owns 10% or more of the
foreign entity.
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For example, a car company engages in foreign direct investment when it:
> establishes (and owns) a new manufacturing facility in another country;
> establishes and owns an a ﬁliate in a tax haven country, even though it
may not conduct much, if any business, in that a ﬁliate;
> acquires 10% or more of an existing foreign ﬁrm.
FDI is di ferent from other types of international investment such as portfolio
investment and non-equity investment.
Portfolio investment is considered to be a more limited and liquid investment
than FDI. The portfolio investor may own shares in a foreign company, but does
not have a signiﬁcant or lasting interest in that company, neither does it exercise
control over that company. Similarly a foreigner may hold private or sovereign
debt issued by a ﬁrm or the government of Country B. The portfolio investor can
relatively easily sell its shares or bonds, especially if they are traded in a market,
moving money out of the foreign company if, for instance, it loses faith in the
company’s management or the broader economic environment or simply sees
better opportunities to proﬁt from other investments. Flows of portfolio
investment are generally considered to be more volatile than FDI, and can rather
suddenly and dramatically reverse course, sometimes wreaking havoc on the
host country in the process.
Contract-based business is sometimes considered as contract-based investment
since it can create payment obligations similar to dividends from equity
investment. Companies such as hotel chains and fast food companies may want
to expand into foreign markets by franchising their operations: foreign-based
individuals or enterprises will pay the hotel chain or fast food company for the
right to use the company’s established brand, access its networks, and employ
its know-how, but not actually own those operations abroad. Similarly, a ﬁrm
with a patent or other intellectual property may grant a license to a foreign
company to use its know-how or name in exchange for future payments. These
types of contractual relationships can be quite similar to FDI in a number of
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ways, for example by enabling cross-border economic engagement, transferring
standards and technologies, creating or supporting jobs in the host country, and
even enabling the Country A company to control aspects of the Country B
company, but non-equity investments do not involve actual ownership of the
Country B business by the Country A ﬁrm.
There are more questions about whether some other contractual arrangements
should be considered as foreign investment. When a clothing company wants to
reduce costs, it could move its existing manufacturing operations to a country
with lower labor costs; this is clearly an example of FDI, or the company could
ﬁnd a garment manufacturer in the low-labor-cost country and contract to buy
clothes from that manufacturer. Similarly, an agricultural company could
establish its own farms in foreign countries to grow its crops (an example of FDI),
or it could contract with local growers and agree to purchase their products,
perhaps even providing technical assistance. Most observers would not consider
these to be foreign investment since no capital crosses borders and no payment
obligations similar to license fees or franchise fees result. Yet, they may
nevertheless transfer technology and management skills similar to those
expected of foreign direct investment.
Di ferent forms of cross-border capital  lows include, among others:
> trade credit (credit o fered by suppliers, allowing purchasers to buy
goods or services now, but pay later);
>  loans (debt held by a bank to ﬁnance overseas companies, debt held by
multilateral or regional ﬁnancial institutions, corporate or sovereign
bonds held by foreigners);
> and o ﬁcial government  lows, such as development aid.
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DIAGRAM What distinguishes FDI from other types of foreign investment?
Di ferent countries send and receive di ferent mixes of investment  lows;
di ferent types of investment  lows can have di ferent impacts and warrant
di ferent policy treatment in the countries sending and receiving it.
The Current Investment Regime
The international investment regime comprises a number of parts. This book
focuses on the most controversial pieces, the many international treaties that
provide protection to investors, generally known as International Investment
Agreements (IIAs) and the associated system of dispute settlement, referred to
as International State Dispute Settlement mechanism (ISDS).
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There are other arrangements which could be included, which set out additional
or overlapping principles, norms, and rules for international investment,
especially the investment rules associated with the World Trade Organization
(WTO). Both the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs),
which restricts host countries’ imposition of performance requirements on
foreign investors, and national schedules under the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), which ensure market access to certain investors, form
part of the international investment regime as well.
What are IIAs and ISDS?
International Investment Agreements (IIAs)
IIAs come in various forms. There are now more than three thousand bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) covering states in all parts of the world, and
investment provisions are included in many regional and plurilateral trade
agreements (RTAs).
Although the provisions di fer somewhat in various treaties and agreements, in
general, IIAs are treaties that provide standards of treatment that protect the
interests of qualiﬁed foreign investors (who come from one country and invest in
another country) against adverse State interference in their investments. There
are several common standards of treatment typically found in most IIAs. These
are: national treatment – the requirement that countries treat foreign investors
no less favorably than domestic investors; fair and equitable treatment – the
requirement that countries treat foreign investors fairly and equitably, or
according to an international minimum standard of treatment; full protection
and security; and prohibitions on expropriation without due process and
adequate compensation.
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Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)
The vast majority of IIAs provide investors access to an investor-state dispute
settlement (ISDS) mechanism. This is a system through which individual
investors can bring to an arbitral body claims against states for interference in
their investments – without the need to convince their home government to
bring a case on their behalf. This unique feature, whereby private ﬁrms can bring
cases against foreign governments, has attracted signiﬁcant public attention.
The dispute is almost always judged by an international arbitration tribunal,
where the investor is entitled to name one arbitrator, while the host country
names a second. The two parties are to attempt to agree on a third arbitrator,
who becomes chairman of the tribunal. If they fail to agree on the third
arbitrator, an administering body, speciﬁed in the treaty, names the third
arbitrator. In most cases, the administering body is the International Centre for
the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or the United Nations
Commission on Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The award rendered in these
arbitrations is generally ﬁnal and not subject to appeal.
An investor may also have recourse to ISDS without an IIA being in place. Many
contracts for large projects, especially for mining and petroleum, have long
included provisions that refer disputes to international arbitration, which is
managed much like that of the general ISDS system and generates similar
problems. On the other hand, the contractual provisions usually give rights to
both the investor and the state to call on arbitration in a dispute. Further, some
countries have inserted into their investment laws provisions that unilaterally
give foreign investors access to ISDS even in the absence of an IIA.
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15. ACRONYMS
15.1 ACRONYMS
ASEAN - Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BEPS - Base Erosion and Proﬁt Shi ting
BITS - Bilateral Investment Treaties
BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa
CPTPP - Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership
DCF - Discounted Cash low
ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States
ECT - Energy Charter Treaty
FDI - foreign direct investment
FET - Fair and Equitable Treatment
FMV - Fair Market Value
FTA - Free Trade Agreement
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GATS - General Agreement on Trade in Services
ICSID - International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
IIAs - International Investment Agreements
IMF - International Monetary Fund
ISDS - Investor-State Dispute Settlement
MERCOSUR - Mercado Común del Cono Sur (Southern Cone Common Market)
MLI - Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to
Prevent BEPS
NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PACER - Paciﬁc Agreement on Closer Economic Relations
PAIC - Pan African Investment Code
PCA - Permanent Court of Arbitration
RCEP - Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
RTAs - Regional and plurilateral trade agreements
SADC - Southern African Development Community
SDGs - Sustainable Development Goals
SIA - Sustainability Impact Analysis
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TPF - Third-Party Funding
TPP - Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership Agreement
TRIMs - Trade-Related Investment Measures
TRIPS - Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights
UNCITRAL - United Nations Commission on Trade Law
UNCTAD - United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
WTO - World Trade Organization
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